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ABSTRACT
The safety benefit of Stop-sign treatment employed at passive highway
rail crossings has been a subject of research for many years. The objective of
this study is to assess the effectiveness and impacts of Stop-sign treatment on
crossing safety. This research addresses safety at public highway-railroad grade
crossings across the United States within a 26-year period of accident history for
Crossbucks-only controlled crossings that were upgraded to Stop-sign control.
This study utilized Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) accident data to
investigate average accident frequency at crossings with the two different types
of passive-crossing sign controls. The research database was created by
locating and extracting records relevant to public crossings, excluding private,
pedestrian, and grade-separated crossings.
The research followed a three-part approach. The first part of the study
used statistical analysis methods to evaluate accident frequencies for target
crossings. Analysis of accident frequencies that occurred during both phases of
installation history indicates that accidents were significantly lower during the
Stop phase than during the Crossbucks-only phase.
The second part of the research used logistic regression modeling to
further evaluate accident risks and factors at these two types of passive railroad
grade-crossing treatments. Results of the logistic regression were reported
according to the main effect of various factors and variation of those factors. An
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analysis of covariance was performed between factors of statistically significant
contribution.
The third part of the research synthesized data into a set of models
designed to predict safety performance of Stop signs and Crossbucks. Negativebinomial regression modeling was used to identify attributes and limits for which
Stop signs showed superior safety benefits.
This research concludes that Stop controls did lead to discernable
reduction in the accident rate, particularly for the period since ISTEA (1991).
Annual accident frequencies were significantly higher during the period when
crossings were controlled by Crossbucks only.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

"The care of human life and happiness … is the first and only
objective of good government."
Thomas Jefferson
President Jefferson‟s quote is very similar to the first Cannon of Ethics for
engineers:
“The engineer’s paramount responsibility is the safety, health and
wellbeing of the general public.”
Engineers Code of Ethics
It should not be construed from the above statements that engineers are
responsible for human life and happiness. However, if the engineer does not
meet the first cannon‟s requirement for safety, health, and wellbeing of the
general public, human life and happiness are difficult to attain.
This dissertation is about safety; specifically, highway-railroad gradecrossing safety. Its focus is on the impacts of Stop signs used at highwayrailroad grade crossings. The objective is to examine the safety record to
determine if Stop sign augmentation of Crossbuck-controlled crossings has had
an impact on safety as evidenced in the accident record of road users at public,
passive, highway-railroad grade crossings.
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1.1 Background
Vehicle-train crashes are the most dangerous traffic accidents at highwayrailroad grade-crossings. The average weight ratio of train to automobile is about
4,000 to one.(1) Such a huge mass difference results in a great injury/fatality
rate in train-automobile crashes. Therefore, compared to highway intersections,
although the annual crash frequency of grade crossings is relatively lower, railhighway grade-crossing safety issues are critical.
Highway-rail grade crossings are generally categorized as two groups,
namely active and passive.(2) Active grade crossings use devices to detect
approaching trains and warn motorists by initiating sequences of flashing lights,
bells, and/or gate closures. Passive grade crossings do not detect approaching
trains. Instead, motorists must take notice of the passive controls (signs and
markings), understand what they mean, listen, search for trains, and respond
appropriately.
During the past 30 years, the annual accident rate has significantly
decreased at rail-highway grade crossings. However, this reduction has come
about largely through improvements to the level of grade-crossing control (i.e.,
flashing lights, automatic gates, grade separation), as well as through
improvements to active warning devices. For passive crossings, there has been
no clear improvement in driver behavior or crash experience.(3)
The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) provides
guidance on what traffic-control devices (TCDs) should be used at public-passive
rail-highway grade crossings. As a minimum, one Crossbuck sign shall be used
2

on each highway approach to every highway-rail grade crossing, alone or in
combination with other traffic-control devices in order to mark the location of the
railroad tracks at the point where they cross the road.(2) Stop signs should be
used at the discretion of the responsible State or local highway agency if
highway-rail grade crossings have two or more trains per day and are without
automatic traffic control devices. The optional TCD treatment at passive
crossings includes a Yield sign or a Stop sign. Yield signs have not been
frequently deployed at rail-highway grade crossings (3), and no research appears
to have been done comparing Yield signs to Crossbucks at crossings.(4)
Engineers and policy makers who make decisions about traffic-control
posting configurations are not in complete agreement on whether Stop signs are
effective when used at highway-railroad grade crossings. The safety benefit of
Stop-sign treatment employed at passive crossings has been a controversial
focus point for many years. NCHRP Report 470 indicated that there were
differences of opinion regarding the use of Stop signs at passive grade crossings
including don‟t use at all, use only under certain conditions, and use at all
passive crossings unless hazardous.(3)
The use of Stop signs was authorized by the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) (5) and the Federal Highway
Administration.(6) A prior study reported that upgrades from no signs or
Crossbucks-only to Stop signs significantly reduced accident rates at both lowvolume and higher-volume highway-rail grade crossings.(7) The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) suggested a broader use of Stop signs at
3

railroad-highway grade crossings and recommended Stop signs as an interim
device until intelligent transportation systems are developed to warn the driver.(8)
Sanders, et al., found that Stop signs were used more frequently in urban areas
and that crossings having Stop signs tend to have higher train volumes; accident
rates for Stop-sign crossings were lower than those for Crossbuck-only crossings
for higher vehicle-train exposure values; and Stop signs, when properly used,
resulted in improved driver behaviors adequate for the detection and avoidance
of trains.(9) They suggested that Stop signs should be applied selectively, only
at hazardous passive grade crossings rather than indiscriminately at all passive
grade crossings. Additionally, in Canada it was found that Stop-sign
countermeasure can improve crossing safety performance by as much as
35%.(10)
On the other hand, other researchers did not suggest the use of Stop
signs because observational studies showed that motorists frequently
disregarded Stop signs at grade crossings.(11, 12) If the Stop sign were used
indiscriminately (3), the high level of noncompliance might increase and carry
over to other locations. These observational studies showed that the percentage
of drivers not coming to a complete stop at grade crossings was higher than the
percentage who did not come to a complete stop at highway intersections.
Evidence was lacking to support the claim that a high noncompliance rate
correspondingly leads to a high accident rate at Stop-controlled crossings.
A recent study examined 10 years of collision data in seven Midwestern
states using the FRA accident database and compared collision rates among
4

four types of crossings: Crossbucks, Stop signs, flashing lights, and gates.(4)
The collision rate calculation was based on millions of crossing vehicles, the
average number of daily trains, and the product between them (exposure factor).
It was reported that compared to other types of crossings, collision rates for
crossings with Stop signs were much higher, especially when using millions of
crossing vehicles as the collision rate calculation base. However, those collision
rate calculations neglected other significant risk-evaluation factors, such as
number of tracks, road surface type, and train speed, which are often used to
investigate effectiveness of countermeasures at grade crossings.(13, 14)
The safety benefit of the Stop-sign treatment employed at passive
crossings appears still unresolved and controversial. Thus, one question is what
happens at crossings where a change is made from Crossbucks to Stop signs.
The before-and-after and cross-sectional statistical analysis methods are well
accepted tools, well understood, and have been used to evaluate the
effectiveness of a countermeasure on highway safety by a number of
researchers.(15, 16, 17) In these studies, the effectiveness of specific
countermeasures is determined by comparing collisions at each crossing before
and after their introduction. Additionally, planners and decision makers have not
had a statistical assessment model that allows them to select significant input
risk factors and be able to assess benefit of using a Stop-sign countermeasure at
specific grade crossings.
As will be discussed herein, a unique and statistically robust approach
was developed and used, which resolves many of the inherent problems
5

normally associated with evaluation of Stop-sign effectiveness at passive
crossings.

1.2 Statement of Problem
Do Stop signs improve safety at highway-railroad grade crossings
compared to Crossbucks-only, where the safety of an entity is defined as “the
number of accidents by type and severity expected to occur on the entity in a
certain period, per unit of time” ?(15)
In 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) was
enacted by the U.S. Congress. In Section 1077 of ISTEA, the Secretary of
Transportation was directed by Congress to:
“Revise the Manual of Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) to authorize
States and local governments, at their own discretion, to install stop
or yield signs at any rail-highway grade crossing without automatic
traffic control devices with two or more trains operating across the
crossing per day.”(5)
Before ISTEA, a major question about passively controlled grade
crossings was whether a Stop sign or Yield sign was more effective. Winans
noted that prior to ISTEA, “. . . the MUTCD limited the use of Stop signs to those
rail-highway grade crossings selected after a need was established by a detailed
traffic engineering study, and Yield signs were not accepted as an appropriate
traffic control device at rail-highway grade crossings.”(18)

6

Some members of the highway safety community believe that posting
Stop signs at grade crossings is like crying “wolf”; if a train is not observed on a
regular basis at the crossing, motorists will come to regard Stop signs as having
less meaning than the law intends.(4)
Even though the usage of these controls had been enacted into law by a
Congress anxious to provide additional options to address the continuing safety
problem at public grade crossings, their effectiveness still remained
undocumented. Controversy still exists in the literature and in practice whether
Stop signs significantly enhance safety at passive highway-railroad grade
crossings.

1.3 Research Objectives
This research seeks to:
1. Statistically evaluate accident frequencies during both Crossbucks-only
and Stop-sign treatment phases of crossing history.
2. Statistically evaluate significant factors associated with crossings and
accidents and the propensity (or natural inclination) of drivers to
experience accidents after Stop-sign treatment was added.
3. Build statistical models to analyze and predict annual accident
frequencies for both types of passive grade crossings studied.
In the 1970‟s the Federal Railroad Administration began keeping records
of train-related accidents across the entire United States, resulting in a large
safety-record dataset available for analysis that begins well before and extends
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well after the 1991 ISTEA legislation. With approximately 38 years of accident
data available, and with Stop-sign and Crossbuck-only usage recorded during
that time period, accident propensities at these configurations can now be
examined on a nationwide scale over a significant time period.
Allowing a10-year period from 1970 to 1980 for data input to the FRA
dataset to stabilize and for data reporting procedures to mature (i.e., relatively
complete, unambiguous, accurate and stable), this research examines the trainrelated accident record in the United States from 1980 forward.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In following sections, the concepts of danger and safety, highway-railroad
grade-crossing safety risks, treatment of risks, controversy that exists in the
literature, and previous research regarding the usage of Stop signs at highwayrailroad grade crossings will be presented.

2.1 Background
Railroads predated the automobile and played a vital role in the settlement
and economic development of the nation. Towns and cities sprang up beside
railroad tracks, and city street patterns often were formed parallel and
perpendicular to them.
New modes of transportation evolved out of trade between towns and
cities. Over time, as need intensified and range expanded, more and more
people and vehicles were brought into closer contact.
At first, the crossing of railroad tracks was relatively easy and involved
little conflict, except for the occasional frightened horse. But in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the motorcar was introduced and its
popularity resulted in an ever-increasing number of vehicles on the roadways.
If uncontrolled, the consequence of close contact of frenzied activity is
conflict. With urbanization came an increase in vehicle velocity and number of
vehicles in close proximity, resulting in an increase in property damage, injuries,
9

and crash fatalities. Current issues in road transport safety arose from this
successful mass production of the private automobile.
Transportation accidents, as crashes were previously called, did not begin
with the modern vehicle. Over 100 years ago, Bortkiewicz published accident
studies in his book titled “The Law of Small Numbers”.(19) Bortkiewicz‟s study of
horse-kick accidents precipitated the first of several road-transport safety
theories (Random Events Theory) leading to the most recent approach −
Behavior Theory.
Mathematicians, psychologists, physicians, and others have studied
accidents and made contributions to the realm of road transport safety. Their
focus was to explain the phenomenon of the occurrence of accidents using
examples of their research in accident theory.(19, 20, 21)

2.1.1 Automobile Impact on Transportation Safety
In general over the twentieth century, the United States enjoyed a
declining mortality rate: health improved, daily activities of life were easier to
accomplish, and there was greater opportunity for leisure. (A crude plot of the
mortality rate in the United States during the twentieth century, reflecting deaths
per 1,000 in population, is provided in Figure 1.)
However, traffic mortality frequencies during the same time period reveal a
different picture. Figure 2 shows the annual mortality (deaths per 100,000) due
to traffic crashes for the twentieth century. The fatality rate due to injuries in road

10

Figure 1: Crude mortality rate in the United States during the 20th century,
deaths per 1000 population. The thin dotted line is a Hodrick-Prescott
long-term trend line computed with a smoothing parameter equal to 100. (2)
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Figure 2: Annual mortality (deaths per 100,000 population) due to traffic
crashes(22)

transport crashes grew across the entire century, a phenomenon in the reverse
of the general mortality rate for that time period.
Hinrichs, in his history of James Cunningham, Son and Company that
once made carriages, notes that the automobile made its début in America in the
late 1890s as an import from Europe.(23) He goes on to say that the automobile
began as a toy for the wealthy, and that the automobile age didn‟t begin in
earnest until 1919. Automobiles emerged on the world stage during World War I
when Peugeot taxis carried men to the front from Paris and Model T Fords found
their place on the battlefield as field cars.
In 1919 there were about seven million cars in the United States. Barker
(24) notes that motor vehicles were developed initially to mechanize local
transport, as the steam railway had earlier mechanized it over longer distances.

12

Barker relates that by 1920, just after the War, “the spread of motoring was soon
influencing family expenditure and social habits.”(24)
Examining Figure 2, one can see that the downside of vehicles was
already occurring in the early days of the twentieth century. The most dramatic
period was from the introduction of the automobile around the turn of the century
to a peak in the mid-1930s. Chatburn (25) says that at the beginning of the
1920s, one motorist in seven was annually involved in an accident resulting in
vehicle damage, personal injury, or death.
The fatality growth trend in the early part of the twentieth century is
associated with the rapid expansion of the new automobile technology and is
shown on Figure 3. During this time drivers were inexperienced and vehicles
were often unreliable.

2.1.2 Railroad-Crossing Safety
Accidents occurred at grade crossings as early as the latter half of the
nineteenth century. These conflicts began more in favor of the carriages but
proceeded in favor of the train as engine and car mass increased toward the end
of the century. The same mortality trend seen in the early part of the twentieth
century with regard to the surge in motorcars, was also seen at highway-railroad
grade crossings. Shaw notes that:
“This relative immunity from highway crossing danger which trains
enjoyed for half a century and longer began to diminish in the

13

Figure 3: Three indices of motorization of the U.S economy, 1920-1970(22)
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1920s as the previous trickle of motor vehicles at grade crossings swelled
into a stream.”(26)
Shaw goes on to relate that one of the largest violators seemed to be
large trucks, which he attributes to the “typical carelessness of the truck
driver”.(26) He indicates that:
“Locomotive engineers have had to contend with numerous
gasoline and fuel oil tank trucks, as well as with a wide range of
flat bed trailers, bulldozers, cranes, power shovels, earth scrapers
and other ponderous equipment, crossing the tracks . . . tank truck
drivers seem to show a marked proclivity, perhaps stemming from
a desire to live dangerously, to enter crossings just ahead of
speeding trains.”(26)
The mortality surge that Shaw speaks of can be readily seen from the data
plotted on Figure 4, indicating fatalities at public grade crossings between the
years 1920 and 2004. This figure shows that there was a surge in grade
crossing mortality in the 1920s followed by a steady decline, another surge in the
1960s and 1970s, and then another decline to 2004.
Looking at the trend shown over the same time period on Figure 5, one
can see that the highway-fatality rate increased slightly over the period, but
decreased at railroad crossings. Not shown is the sky-rocketing number of
vehicles and highway miles over the period. When this is considered, along with
safety programs instituted during that time, one can see attenuation was had in
both categories.
15
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Figure 4: Fatalities at public grade crossings, 1920-2004(27)
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Figure 5: Highway fatalities and highway-rail fatalities at public grade
crossings in logarithm scale, 1920-2004
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By the 1980s, substantial safety improvements steadily resulted in
decreased traffic mortality. Because engineering improvements, such as vehicle
and infrastructure safety features, made travel safer, highway fatality trend
remained steadily downward until the early- to mid-1990s. Over the last 10
years, highway mortality has remained relatively constant in the United States at
approximately 43,000 fatalities per year, with only a slight upward trend;
however, highway-railroad grade-crossing accidents and fatalities continued to
drop.

2.2 Safety, Danger, and Risk
2.2.1 Concepts of Safety and Danger
Road transport safety is a global issue, becoming a major cause of death
and serious injury. Merriam Webster describes “safe” as an adjective that means
“secure from liability to harm, injury, danger, or risk.” “Safety” is described as a
noun that means “the state of being safe; freedom from the occurrence or risk of
injury, danger, or loss.”(28)
In Traffic Flow Theory Monograph, the safety of an entity is defined as “the
number of accidents by type, expected to occur on the entity in a certain period,
per unit of time.”(29) According to this definition, safety of an infrastructure
correlates with frequency and/or opportunity for the occurrence of crashes. By
these definitions, the basic philosophy or concept of roadway-vehicle
transportation-system safety is based on risk − risk taken by users entering the
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system, risk involved in mingling with other users, and risk in following certain
routes.
Hauer (15) suggests that safety can be understood through an alternative
approach that is seemingly antithetical − danger, as demonstrated on Figure 6.
Each accident is preceded by a dangerous situation that, in turn, is preceded by
incipient danger that stems from normal traffic. Each level of danger builds on
the previous level in such a manner that the risk continuously grows until
triggered into an accident.
Using this antithetical approach, one can see that risk exists in normal
traffic that leads to incipient danger. Safety is related to danger through risk that
ultimately precipitates “the number of accidents by type, expected to occur on the
entity in a certain period, per unit of time” (15), and, therefore, can be thought of
as a measure of danger.

Figure 6: Continuum of events leading to danger and accidents(15)
19

Generally speaking, crashes occur when vehicles move out of the locus of
a controlled trajectory into conflict with another object, pedestrian, or the earth.
In the case of highway-railroad grade crossings, this occurs when a vehicle
traveling on the road crosses into the path of an oncoming train.
Trains are massive and because of momentum and braking limitations
they may need a mile or more to come to a complete stop. Because of their
momentum and large mass, we can see through means of the energy equation
(E= 1/2 mv2) that a tremendous amount of energy exists. Whenever there is more
energy in the system than can be safely attenuated, an unsafe condition (danger)
exists. When stopping, the energy that is not dissipated in braking goes into
whatever is occupying its path, more specifically the dynamic envelope or the
space influenced by the train along its axis, as shown on Figure 7.

2.2.2 Safety Risks
Many risks are associated with negotiating highway-railroad grade
crossings. As Haddon‟s matrix (20) suggests, at every crossing the fundamental
road-transport system is composed of four interactive elements: the user
(human), the vehicle, the infrastructure, and the environment. Epidemiologically,
Systems Theory says each element has some contribution to risk at a crossing.
To safely negotiate a highway-railroad grade crossing, a motorist must
accomplish the following:
1. Be aware of and see the crossing
2. Understand their duty

20

(a)

(b)
Figure 7: Train dynamic envelope: (a) train dynamic envelope and (b)
typical markings of dynamic envelope(2)
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3. Search for approaching trains
4. Reduce speed, as necessary, to be able to stop when a train is seen
5. Begin to brake in time to stop before the dynamic envelope
For instance, motorists unfamiliar with an area may be unaware that a
crossing exists or motorists may expect grade crossings to be equipped with
signals and automatic gates that warn of the imminent approach of trains.
Richards and Heathington noted that in a survey of 211 Tennessee drivers:
“twenty-two percent of the drivers believed that all grade crossings
had active control warning devices. Sixty-two of the very young
drivers (16-18 years) thought that all crossings had active warning
devices.”(30)
Other potential risks stem from the fact that in rural areas, vegetation often
obscures visibility. And in urban areas, development can be found along
roadways near grade crossings that obscures driver vision of the tracks.
In summary, risk that directly inhibits the driver‟s ability to successfully
negotiate highway-railroad grade crossings includes, but is not limited to:
1. Driver knowledge of the crossing
2. Driver understanding of the duty to stop
3. Obscured vision of approaching trains
4. Driver speed behavior and ability to be able to stop when a train is seen
5. Driver braking behavior and ability to stop before the dynamic envelope
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2.2.3 Treatment of Risks
Grade separation provides the safest solution for negotiating a highwayrail crossing by eliminating mass-disparate vehicles vying for occupancy of the
crossing. But, where grade separation is not possible or practical, most grade
crossings are controlled with active or passive devices to provide warnings and
restrictions for motorists. Each traffic-control device conveys a specific meaning
of warning, guidance, or regulation. Motorists must see, respect, and heed these
signs to safely negotiate the driving environment. Standard Crossbuck and
minimum Stop-control configurations are shown on Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
Active grade crossing devices detect approaching trains and warn
motorists by initiating sequences of flashing lights, bells, and/or gate closures.
Passive grade crossings do not have devices that detect approaching trains.
Instead, motorists must take notice of the signs and markings, understand what
they mean, search for trains, and then respond appropriately.
Section 1A.02 of the MUTCD, Principles of Traffic Control Devices, states:
“To be effective, a traffic control device should meet five basic
requirements:
A. Fulfill a need;
B. Command attention;
C. Convey a clear simple meaning;
D. Command respect from road users; and
E. Give adequate time for proper response.”(2)
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Figure 8: Standard Crossbuck and supplemental number of tracks signs(2)

(a) Separate Mounting

(b) Common Mounting

Figure 9: Standard Crossbuck with Stop sign on separate mounting (a) and
Stop sign and supplemental number of tracks sign mounted on Crossbuck
post (b)(2)
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Part 8 of the MUTCD states that: “the combination of devices
selected or installed at a specific highway-rail grade crossing is referred to
as a „traffic control system‟”.(2)

2.3. Behavior at Intersections
Recently, Stop signs have become more common at highway-railroad
grade crossings, but they are a commonly used regulatory traffic-control device
at roadway intersections. This section reviews some of the literature regarding
motorist behaviors at Stop-controlled highway intersections.
Retting, et al., (31) completed research of Stop-controlled intersection
violations by reviewing police reports of 1,788 crashes from selected areas. Two
thirds of the drivers reportedly came to a stop before proceeding into the
intersection, while 17 percent admitted to neglecting to stop. Failure to see
another vehicle (44%) and obstructed vision (16%) were reportedly the most
frequent reasons for a vehicle to proceed into an intersection in the presence of
another vehicle.
Liu (32) completed a study to determine contributing violation factors. Liu
noted that numerous decisions must be made as a driver approaches an
intersection, and that the speed at which a driver is traveling when arriving at the
intersection is a large determinant as to how the driver reacts. Through a
database analysis, Wang and Knipling (33) reported that most intersectionrelated crashes occur when the posted speed limit is 35 mph or less. Yang and
Najm (34) reported from their research that a majority of crashes occurred at
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around 18 mph with an average speed of 32 mph. Similarly, Chovan, et al., (35)
reported that a number of the crashes occurred on urban roads with lower speed
limits.
Both Pierowicz, et al., (36) and Tijerina, et al., (37) have presented causal
factors that imply a deliberate disobedience of traffic-control devices. In the
survey, drivers were provided with a “go/no-go” scenario in which the “go”
decision could be interpreted as aggressive. Twenty-nine percent of the drivers
opted to take the aggressive action. Of those drivers, 69 percent indicated that
their motivation was to save time and 12 percent reported doing it out of
frustration. Of surveyed drivers, 99 percent acknowledged the dangers of redlight running.(38)
The decision to run or attempt to beat a traffic signal (or a train through a
grade crossing) might be based on failure to see cross traffic (train); misjudgment
of velocity, distance, or direction associated with the perceived traffic (train); the
assumption that other vehicles will yield to the violating vehicle; or a belief that a
collision can be avoided.

2.4 Review of Selected Grade-Crossing Research
Motorist behaviors have been studied for highway-railroad grade
crossings as a distinct group like those in the previous section for roadway
intersections. Abraham, et al., (39) studied driver behavior at 37 grade crossings
in Michigan, revealing significant violations of traffic-control devices. They noted
that, at a 95 percent confidence level, multi-track crossings of multiple road lanes
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demonstrated significantly more violations and crash counts than sites consisting
of multiple tracks and single-lane roadway approaches. They also observed that
drivers aged 25 to 40 years committed more violations than drivers in other age
groups and that, overall, male drivers offended more than females.
Russell, et al., (40) stressed two key issues in reducing risks at passive
grade crossings on low-volume roads: provide adequate sight distance and
make the crossings and warning devices conspicuous, particularly at night. The
authors also cited the results of a Kansas demonstration project recommending
that additional high-performance retro-reflective material be provided at all rural
passive grade crossings.
Nam and Lee (41) used a zero-inflated Poisson model to show that
highway-rail grade-crossing accident frequencies can be reduced by decreasing
the crossing angle, increasing clearing sight distance, increasing warning time,
increasing effective lane width, and decreasing average annual daily traffic
(AADT) passing through the grade crossing. They list Stop signs as one of
several complex interaction variables found, noting that some of these
interactions, (not necessarily involving Stop signs), contribute to accident
frequency as a result of train-object impacts, whereas others appear to mitigate
the frequency, presumably by altering the driver‟s awareness in the gradecrossing section.
Carroll and Warren (42) studied photo enforcement at six highway rail
crossings across the United States. They stated that the problem at highway-
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railroad crossings is largely driver behavior and showed that photo enforcement
reduced violations in the range of 34 to 92 percent.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research addresses public highway-railroad grade crossings.
Standard statistical methods are used to evaluate the difference in accident
frequencies between before and after periods for the target population. The null
hypothesis for this study is that there is no difference in accident frequencies for
highway-railroad grade crossings controlled by Crossbucks-only and those
controlled by Stop signs. The null hypothesis was tested by comparing accident
frequencies of the two distributions over the study period.
The research follows a three-part approach. The first part will establish,
from accident frequencies during each year of the study period, the overall
change in safety since 1980 as the crossings were converted to Stop control. It
will test the hypothesis regarding Stop usage safety at grade crossings and
establish a general is- or is-not-safer analysis. The second part will develop an
accident-comparison model to examine accident attribute distributions of the
target population and determine where Stop signs have been most effective.
The third part will develop an accident frequency model for the target population
in order to predict accident frequency based on crossing attributes where Stop
signs have been implemented.
After the three parts have been developed, overall conclusions and
recommendations concerning the effectiveness of the usage of Stop-sign
installations at highway-railroad grade crossings can be made.
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What follows is a detailed description of the methods used in this
research.

3.1 Research Data
3.1.1 Federal Railroad Administration Datasets
Local records are difficult to find and, when located, do not effectively
combine with other records to form a national database. It is almost impossible
to provide a regional, state, and national dataset because each has a unique
format. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) datasets were identified as
the single most complete and accurate datasets available for this research. After
these data were obtained, FRA staff who were responsible for data maintenance
since 1975 were interviewed. The appropriateness and quality of the data for
this research were evaluated. Relevant data were then selected and subdivided
for this study.
Three record sets were selected for use:
1. The Grade-Crossing Inventory database is a record of the current
inventory, as it exists in its current configuration, with one record for each
crossing location. Crossing inventory records date from the early- to mid1970‟s. Reference attributes in this database reflect the current state of
each crossing.
2. The Grade-Crossing Inventory History database reflects the date
and nature of updates made to the crossing records. Reference attributes
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in this database reflect the state changes of each crossing, including a
reason for the update and an effective date for the change.
3. The Grade-Crossing Accident History database provides a record
of accidents that have occurred at the crossings and the conditions at the
time of the accident. Reference attributes in this database reflect
conditions at the time of a crash.
Generally, these databases are large, flat files. They are not maintained
in the most modern database structure, which makes maintenance and
coordination between the databases tedious. Descriptions of the variables that
are stored in the Inventory and Accident databases can be found in Appendix 1.
Although latitude and longitude data are available for crossings, the databases
are not spatially enabled for GIS purposes.
Several potential points of confusion were recognized and accounted for.
Some duplicates of data are found in the Grade-Crossing Inventory database.
Also, records reflected in one database may not be in agreement with records in
another because they are maintained separately. For example, it was
discovered that entry codes for attribute domains differ between the GradeCrossing Inventory database and the Grade-Crossing Accident History database.
In like manner, posting updates made by the railroad companies and/or
local and state agencies may not always be timely. Consequently, reference
attributes that reflect conditions at the time of a crash in the Grade-Crossing
Accident History database may not always reflect the state for the same period in
the Grade-Crossing Inventory database or even the Grade-Crossing Inventory
31

History database. The databases are not linked or cross-referenced. The lack of
relational or object-oriented design makes examining crossing characteristics
challenging.
Crossings generally have two approaches and each may differ greatly in
geometry, development, visibility, and other factors. Unfortunately in the
inventory, there is only one entry for each crossing rather than one for each
approach.
Although Stop and Yield controls at grade crossings have been legal since
ISTEA and under certain conditions before then, in the database there is no code
to denote Yield controls. This lack is compounded by the fact that entry codes
for attribute domains differ between the Grade-Crossing Inventory database and
the Crossing Accident History database. An especially careful effort is required
in order to not confuse the code domains when evaluating the two together.
Potential shortcomings were recognized and accounted for whenever
appropriate.
The current FRA grade-crossing inventory contains 406,395 entities split
between public, private, and pedestrian crossings. It can be seen from the data
that fully 75 percent of the inventory consists of at-grade crossings (361,128),
with roughly two-thirds of those being public crossings (214,980). Approximately
50 percent of public grade crossings are controlled by Crossbucks or Stop signs
(120,016). Of these, 106,503 (94%) are controlled by Crossbucks and only
13,513 (6%) are controlled by Stop signs.
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3.1.2 Data Preparation
This research addresses public highway-railroad grade crossings that are
Stop-controlled after having been updated from Crossbucks within the analysis
period. Private highway-rail crossings are not included because other factors
exist that would present an unclear and inaccurate evaluation of the
effectiveness of Stop-sign usage.
The research database was created by locating and extracting records
relevant to this research:
1. Public crossings only, excluding private and pedestrian crossings
2. Crossings at grade only, eliminating grade-separated crossings
When a database is being created, it is not immediately operational.
There is a period during which the record set is not yet complete or current
because data is still being added. Additionally, time is needed for those entering
and maintaining the data to become fully familiar with the database‟s operation.
So, for purposes of this research, a beginning date of 1980 was selected. An
ending date of 2006 was deemed to be close enough to the present to be
completely entered and still current. Thus, this research covers 26 years of
accident history.
The relevant records within the FRA databases were divided into four
different groups:
1. Crossings controlled by Crossbucks-only throughout the study period
(60,024)
2. Crossings controlled by Stop signs throughout the study period (3,628)
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3. Crossings controlled by Crossbucks and subsequently upgraded by
adding Stop signs (7,394)
4. Crossings upgraded from Stop signs to active controls (305) and all
other crossings (active controls, no controls, etc.) (48,665)
Group one consists of crossings that remained controlled by Crossbucksonly during the study period and Group two consists of crossings that were
always controlled by Stop signs during the study period; hence, there was no
change of control in either group. Because this is a before-and-after study,
Groups one and two were culled from the data used in this research. Group four
was not applicable to the objective of this study and was also culled.
Group three, however, is comprised of crossings controlled by Crossbucks
subsequently upgraded to add Stop signs and shares the same group attributes
before and after Stop control was added. Group three, therefore, is used in this
research and.
Since each part of the research sought to answer different questions using
differing analytical methods, combinations and data formatting were required.
The following subsections describe this data preparation.

3.1.3 Data Reduction for Hypothesis Testing
During the study period, 7,394 crossings were found to belong in group
three, the target population. These crossings were upgraded nationwide at a
rate of approximately 274 sites per year, varying between a low of 63 in 1987 to
a high of 890 in 1994. The constant upgrading provided a population of
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crossings that were in one posting configuration or the other during some portion
of the study period. The varying upgrade dates provide sub-groupings with
various durations of posting configurations, both before and after upgrade.
The Grade-Crossing Inventory History database was queried to isolate
crossings that were converted in each year of the study period. A plot of the
number of annual upgrades is indicated on Figure 10. The accumulated number
of crossings by type for the target population is shown on Figure 11.
The data for each crossing was divided and analyzed in two time periods:
when it was controlled by Crossbucks-only and when it was controlled by Stop
signs. At the beginning of the study period, all crossings in the population were
controlled by Crossbucks-only. By the end of the study period, all crossings in
the population had Stop signs added.
No. Annual Upgrades
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Figure 10: Number of annual crossing upgrades
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Figure 11: Accumulated number of crossing types annually by crossing
type

36

At each crossing, accident frequencies were compiled and distributions
prepared by year of accident. In this compilation, the accidents that occurred
during the time that a crossing was controlled by crossbucks-only were
separated from the accidents that occurred when the crossing was controlled by
Stop signs. Comparing the accident frequencies before and after upgrade over
the 26-year period is useful because the only discernable difference for the
population is limited to the before-after sign controls. This unique set allows this
research to determine differences that contributed to the impact of Stop signs.

3.1.4 Data Reduction for Accident-Propensity Comparison
A query sequence was compiled to extract records from the GradeCrossing Inventory History database that indicated the date when crossings were
updated to Stop controls and the duration during which the crossings were under
each control type. The Grade-Crossing Accident History database was then
queried to link accidents at each crossing that occurred in the respective phases.
Frequencies of accidents were calculated for each crossing in each phase.
Appropriate independent variables were then selected from the database.
A list of evaluated independent variables, their definitions, and their categorical
groupings can be seen on Table 1. Variables were further categorized into
subcategories found in the FRA databases. To create categorical data for this
comparison analysis, continuous data were grouped into ranges. The query
result was formatted for input to logistic-regression analysis.
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3.1.5 Data Reduction for Accident-Prediction Model
Records were extracted from the Grade-Crossing Inventory History
database for each crossing with phase duration date limits. These records were
then linked to records in the Grade-Crossing Accident History database for each
respective crossing. The result was formatted for input for negative-binomial
regression modeling as shown on Table 2 (see Appendix 4). Variables were
categorized into subcategories found in the FRA databases. Continuous data
were then grouped into ranges, as in the previous analysis, to create categorical
data for negative-binomial modeling.

Table 1: Descriptions of independent variables (accident characteristics)
used in hypothesis testing
Variable Name

Definition

Levels

INJURIES

# of injured for reporting Railroad
calculated from F6180.55a‟s
submitted

Injury // No injury

VEHICLE SPEED

highway user estimated speed:

Speed in miles per hour

VEHICLE TYPE

highway user type of vehicle:

Car // Truck/bus // Other

POSITION

position of highway user:

Stuck // Moving over crossing

VISIBILITY (TIME
OF DAY)

daylight period

Day // Dawn/dusk // Night

WEATHER

weather conditions:

Good // Cloudy // Severe

TRACK
CLASSIFICATION

FRA track class: 1-6

Lower track classes (1 2 3) = 0
Higher track classes (4 5 6) =1

TRAIN SPEED

speed of train in miles per hour

<=30 mph // >30 mph

location of warning:

Both sides

WARNING
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LOCATION

Side of vehicle approach
Opposite side of vehicle approach

LIGHTS

lights at crossing:

yes // no
Stopped and then proceeded (STP)

MOTORIST
ACTION

action of motorist:

Stopped on crossing (SOC)
Did not stop (DNS)

SIGHT DISTANCE

primary obstruction of track view:

DRIVER

highway vehicle driver casualty

USERS KILLED

# of highway-rail crossing users
killed

Not obstructed // Obstructed
Driver casualty // Driver not casualty
User killed // User not killed

Table 2: Data input type used for negative-binomial regression
NUMBER
OF
ACCIDENTS

CONTROL
PERIOD
(YRS)

CONTROL
TREATMENT (X1)
[STOP(1) OR XBUCK(0)]

OTHER
CROSSING
FEATURES

i

N

X1

X2,…….Xi

00001

2

16

0

---

00001

5

10

1

---

00002

3

5

0

---

00002

7

21

1

---

---

---

---

---

---

CROSSING
ID

During the analysis it was recognized that distributions of paved and
unpaved roads could cause problems in the results, since AADT was
substantially different for each type of road surface. This problem was resolved
by querying the data to create separate input sets for paved and unpaved roads.
Then these datasets were prepared separate for negative-binomial regression.

39

3.2 Research Methodology
3.2.1 Statistical Analysis of Overall Accident Experience
Sites were selected for before- and after-upgrade assessment. Crossing
subsets that had posting configuration changes were identified:
1. Timeframes in which they were Crossbucks-only controlled
2. Timeframes in which they were Stop-controlled
Descriptive statistics were compiled for the attributes of the identified crossings
as well as for the reference dataset.
Control periods were established for each crossing to define the duration of
control by Crossbucks, the year the crossing was upgraded, and the duration of
control by Stop sign. For each year, beginning with the first posting change date
in 1980 and continuing year to year for the balance of the study period to 2006,
all crossings that had changes during each year and the number of crashes that
occurred were tabulated.
Accidents were linked to the crossings by Crossing ID compiled in
Crossbuck-only and Stop-control regimes. Accident frequency was computed for
each year for the crossings, noting type of control. Annual accident frequencies
were computed by summing the yearly number of accidents occurring at
Crossbucks and dividing by the number of Crossbuck- controlled crossings that
existed that year. The same was done for Stop-controlled crossings.

  K iy 

K y  1000
 n 
y



(Eq. 1)
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Where:
K y = Average accident frequency (per 1000 crossings) in year y
K iy = Number of accidents at crossing i in year y
n y = Number of crossings existing in year y

This process yielded a tabulation of accident frequencies for both the
Crossbuck-only-controlled crossings (before) and the Stop-controlled crossings
(after) for each year in the study period and the difference in number of crashes
in the two periods (before and after). Analysis was made of accident frequency
before and after Stop-control was installed at target crossings. The results were
tabulated by accidents per 1000 crossings per year and plotted for each year for
each control type.
A statistical analysis was made of the results to determine if the difference
between the two control group accident frequencies was significant. A test was
made to determine the distribution of the datasets and to test their differences.
The null hypothesis for this study was that there is no difference in accident
frequencies at highway-railroad grade crossings controlled by Crossbucks-only
and those controlled by Stop signs.

3.2.2 Accident Propensity Comparison
The difference between accident frequencies under the two passive
controls over the study period was determined in part one of the research. In
part two, a comparison was made of accident propensity for the subject passive
controls, defining parameters associated with the crossings and subsequent
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accidents, in order to explain the difference in the accident frequencies defined in
the first part of the research.
Categories of the parameters found in the FRA databases were compared
to a common base state to evaluate accident propensity for the various
attributes. For example, accidents that occurred at dawn/dusk and accidents that
occurred at night were each compared to a base state of accidents occurring in
daylight for respective Stop and Crossbuck-only configurations. In this way, the
propensities for accidents were established for Stop and Crossbuck-only
configurations according to the parameters found in the FRA databases, relative
to each other.
The analysis needed to evaluate dichotomous data – two conditions at a
time – for two periods of configuration. Since there are issues with ordinary
linear regression, logit or probit regression is normally used.(37) The logit
regression model was used for this research.

Logistic regression is one of a class of models known as generalized
linear models. It belongs to the group of regression methods used to describe
the relationship between explanatory variables and a discrete response variable.
Binary-logistic regression can be used to test association between a dependent
variable and related potential factors, to rank the relative importance of
independent variables, and to assess interaction effects.(37) It is proper to use
when the dependent is a dichotomous variable (did or didn‟t happen). Binarylogistic regression is used in this study because the dependent variable Y (sign
treatment) can take on two values Y = 0 (before, when treatment was Crossbuck42

only) or Y = 1 (after, when the treatment had changed by the addition of Stop
signs).
Target crossings were isolated from the Grade-Crossing Inventory History
database. Associated accident records were then extracted from the GradeCrossing Accident History database and prepared for logistic-regression
analysis.

In logistic regression, the dependent variable is a called a “logit”. A
logit model was used to compare the propensity of motorists to experience
crashes at the two types of passive railroad grade-crossing treatments. The logit

is expressed as the natural logarithm of the odds as shown in Equation 2.
 P 
Logit (P) = ln (odds) = ln 

1 P 

(Eq. 2)

g(x) =  0  1 X 1   2 X 2  ...   n X n

(Eq. 3)

Where:
P = Probability of an event occurring
1  P = Probability of an event not occurring

g(x) = A measure of the total contribution of all risk factors used in the
model
X 1...n = Independent variables of interest

 n = Model coefficients
From Equation 2, P represents the probability of an accident occurring
for a given set of risk factors. If we let g(x), represent exposure to that set of
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accident risk factors as demonstrated in Equation 4, we can build the logistic
regression model. The function g(x) is set equal to the logit.
 P 
Logit P   ln 
 = g(x) =  0  1 X 1   2 X 2  ...   n X n
1  P 

(Eq. 4)

 P 
ln 
 = g(x)
1  P 

(Eq. 5)

Reducing Equation 5, the logit of the multiple logistic-regression model
(link function), takes the form shown in Equation 6 and is used to model how the
probability P of an event may be affected by one or more explanatory variables.
 P 
g ( x)

 = e
1 P 

P=

e g x
1  e g x

(Eq. 6)

In this research, odds ratio represents relative risk comparison between
Stop-controlled and Crossbuck-only crossings. The odds ratio tells the relative
amount by which the odds of the outcome increase or decrease when the value
of the predictor value is increased by one unit. In the comparisons between
accidents occurring at Stop signs and accidents occurring at Crossbucks-only:
1. An odds ratio of 1 signifies there is no difference in risk between the
two comparison categories.
2. An odds ratio of <1 signifies accidents in the comparison categories
are less likely to occur at crossings treated with Stop signs than at
crossings treated with Crossbucks-only.
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3. An odds ratio of >1 signifies accidents are more likely to occur at
crossings treated with Stop signs than at crossings treated with
Crossbucks-only.

3.2.3 Statistical Modeling of Accident Frequency
The objective of this part of the research is to develop statistical accidentfrequency models to be used for accident prediction in the target population in
order to evaluate safety performance of stop-controlled crossing attributes and to
identify significant accident risk factors that reflect crossing-related attributes.
The models are developed from the number of accidents, expressed as count
data, which occurred at each crossing during respective sign-control periods. It
was found in a previous study (43) that using Poisson models to predict accident
frequency at grade crossings results in concerns about overdispersion. This
problem can be overcome by using more flexible negative-binomial models.
Therefore, the negative-binomial model was applied in this study.
The negative-binomial regression model introduces an error compensation
term,  i , to account for the bias caused by overdispersion, as shown in Equation
7.
ln i    0  1 X 1   2 X 2  ......   i X i   i

Where:
β0 = Intercept
Xi = Independent variables of interest
βi = Model coefficients for independent variable Xi
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(Eq. 7)

λi = Expected number of collisions
Introducing this error term into the formulation of the NB model allows the
variance to be different from the mean in such a way as shown in Equation 8.
Var (k i )  Eki 1  Eki 

(Eq. 8)

Where:
E(ki) = Expected value of accident counts at crossing i
ά = Measure of dispersion, equal to the variance of the error term (gamma
distributed rather than normally distributed as in the case of the Poisson
model)
The difference and dynamic of the NB model rest with the measure of
dispersion ά. It should be noted that as ά  0, Var(ki)  E(ki), converging to a
Poisson model. In this study, by assuming the negative-binomial model and
observing the dispersion term, ά, the null hypothesis of equi-dispersion was
tested. The negative binomial distribution has the form shown in Equation 9.

Pk i  

(1 /  )  k i )
(k i )
(1 /  ) 1 / 
(
) (
) ki
(1 /  )k i ! (1 /  )  k i !
(1 /  )  k i !

(Eq. 9)

Since the duration of the control period for Crossbucks-only or Stop signs
was different at each crossing, this duration of the control period was selected as
an offset variable (N) in the negative-binomial model. Thus, the negative-binomial
model is used to estimate the accident rate at each crossing per year (   i / N )
when a crossing is controlled by either Crossbucks-only or Stop signs. Although
the control pattern was treated as an independent factor, other independent
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variables of crossing characteristics were also recorded in the Grade-Crossing
Inventory database. Table 2 illustrates the data input format for the negativebinomial regression model. The expected accident rate at each crossing per year
depends on the explanatory variables and can be expressed exponentially as
Equation 10.

  i / N  exp(  0  1 X 1   2 X 2  ......   i X i )

(Eq. 10)

The SAS program procedure, GENMOD, was used for model
development. Hypothesis testing was based on a significance level of 0.05.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Statistical Analysis of Overall Accident Experience
In1980 at the beginning of the study period, all crossings in the target
population were controlled by Crossbucks only. Each was upgraded to Stop
control at some time in the ensuing 26-year analysis period. On average during
that period, approximately 232 crashes occurred annually at the 7,394 population
crossing sites. An annual average of 137 crashes occurred at Crossbuckcontrolled crossings and 95 at Stop-controlled crossings. Descriptive statistics
compiled for the two control categories are reflected in Table 3.
Table 4 shows results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test for the
accident distributions of the two study groups. It was found that accident
frequencies were normally distributed at both Crossbuck- and Stop-controlled
crossings at a significance level of p>0.05 (p= 0.934 for Stop signs and p= 0.071
for Crossbucks). Histograms and curves of accident frequencies plotted on
Figure 12 represent the two normal distributions. ANOVA results show that there
is a statistically significant difference (F1, 51, 21.726, p< 0.001) between accident
frequencies for target crossings during Crossbuck- and Stop-control phases.
Results indicate a mean of 27.131 crashes per 1,000 crossings per year at
Stop-controlled crossings and a mean of 39.869 crashes per 1,000 crossings per
year for Crossbucks-controlled crossings. This is a difference of 12.738
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for accident distributions

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Std.
Error

95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Min.
Lower
Bound
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

Max.
Upper
Bound

Stop

26

27.131

5.4108

1.0611

24.945

29.316

17.4

37.5

X-buck

26

39.869

12.8419

2.5185

34.682

45.056

23.6

96.8

Total

52

33.500

11.6857

1.6205

30.247

36.753

17.4

96.8

Table 4: One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality
Parameters
N

Crossbuck

26

26

27.131

39.869

5.4108

12.8419

Absolute

.106

.254

Positive

.068

.254

-.106

-.206

.539

1.293

.934

.071

Normal Parameters Mean
Std. Deviation
Most Extreme
Differences

Stop

Negative
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
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Figure 12: Histogram of crash frequencies of Stop-controlled (S) and
Crossbuck-controlled (X) grade-crossings

crashes/1000 crossings/year, or a 46.95% higher accident frequency at
Crossbucks than at Stop signs.
At the beginning of the study period, all crossings in the target population
were controlled by Crossbucks-only. Over the next 26 years, they were gradually
converted to Stop control. By the end of the study period all target crossings had
been upgraded to Stop control. The conversions proceeded continuously;
therefore, evenly distributed groupings of crossings with different before and after
period durations evolved.
Accident frequencies for target crossings per 1,000 crossings were
plotted and are shown on Figure 13. Also shown are crossings that were never
upgraded to Stop control. It is apparent that the target crossings had a higher
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Figure 13: Accident frequencies at crossings upgraded from Crossbuck to
Stop control in before-after analysis
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accident frequency than the non-upgraded crossings. Crossings that were
always Crossbucks had fewer crashes in general. On the other hand, it is
reasonable to assume that the purpose for upgrading the target crossings to Stop
signs was because the danger was perceived higher at those crossings or an
accident had occurred. Also, some states and local railroad jurisdictions chose
to upgrade entire groups of their inventory to Stop-sign control.
Figure 13 shows that consistently lower accident frequencies were found
during the Stop-sign phase of the study period than during the Crossbucks-only
phase. One is also aware of the sizeable fluctuations for opposite controls on
each end of the graph. These fluctuations result from low numbers of crossings
in one of the two control types during the beginning or end of the study period. It
is also noted that Crossbuck accident frequencies remained fairly constant in
magnitude over the period, while Stop-controlled crossing accident frequencies
decreased, particularly after 1990, tending toward the lower bound of the range
as the number of Stop-sign postings increased.
Figure 14 shows the combined accident frequencies of the target
population (Crossbucks-only and Stop signs) compared to crossings that were
never upgraded over the the entire study period. The combined accident
frequencies of the target population crossings decreased from a value equal to
the Crossbuck-only accident frequency in 1980 to the lower end of the range of
values for Stop-controlled crossings in 2006.
Although Raub and Lucke (36), in their study of seven Midwestern states
over a 10-year period extending from 1994 to 2003 found the highest collision
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Figure 14: Mean accident frequency for entire study population compared
to crossings that were always Crossbuck controlled
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frequencies were at locations where the warning device was a Stop sign, Figure
14 reflects the overall decrease in accident frequencies for the population as
crossings were upgraded to Stop signs. On Figure 15, general linear trends are
plotted for accident frequencies at both upgraded crossings and crossings that
were always Crossbucks over the entire 26-year study period. In both cases the
general trend direction is downward.
Figure 16 shows a more accelerated general linear trend in accident
frequencies after 1991 (ISTEA). By this time, approximately half of the study
period had passed and Stop-controlled crossings were increasingly the
predominant control device in the target population. The slope of the trend in this
region of the curve is much steeper than for the overall period, indicating an
accelerated decline in accident frequency. As the number of crossings with
Stop-sign treatment increased, the accident frequency at those crossings
decreased at a rate of up to 5.9 times the accident frequency at lower-risk
crossings that had always been Crossbuck controlled.

4.2 Accident Propensity Comparison
4.2.1 Significant Factors Contributing to Difference in Accident
Frequencies
A logistic regression was run to determine significant factors that contributed to
the difference in accident frequencies established in the statistical analysis of
overall accident experience. The results of the main-effect model are tabulated
on Table 5 and discussed in this section. The main-effect model
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Figure 15: General linear trend in accident frequencies at upgraded
crossings compared to crossings that were always Crossbucks
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Figure 16: General linear trend in post-ISTEA accident frequencies at
upgraded crossings compared to crossings that were always Crossbucks
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Table 5: Main-effect model
Parameter

Estimate

Intercept

0.2366

AADT
>1000 vs. <=500
500-1000 vs. <=500

-0.1516
-0.2046

Odds
Ratio

0.859
0.815

Standard
Error

Wald
Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

0.1164

4.1299

0.0421

0.0827
0.0813

8.3213
3.3619
6.3325

0.0156
0.0667
0.0119
0.0034
0.0034

ADVANCED WARNING
Yes vs. No

-0.1707

0.843

0.0582

8.5981
8.5981

VEHICLE TYPE
Other vs. Car
Truck/Bus vs. Car

-0.00953
-0.2196

0.991
0.803

0.1352
0.0593

13.9546
0.005
13.6952

0.0009
0.9438
0.0002

0.063
0.1104

30.0440
29.1799
3.225

<.0001
<.0001
0.0725

0.1081
0.0998

33.5221
21.368
33.4757

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

28.0590

<.0001

0.118

28.059

<.0001

0.0589

5.0618
5.0618

0.0245
0.0245
0.0007
0.0007
<.0001
<.0001

VISIBLTY (TIME OF DAY)
Night vs. Daytime
Dawn/Dusk vs. Daytime
MOTORIST ACTION
S.O.C. vs. S.T.P.
D.N.S. vs. S.T.P.
SIGHT DISTANCE
Obstructed vs. Not
Obstructed
INJURIES
Injuries vs. None

-0.3402
-0.1983

-0.4996
-0.5777

-0.625

-0.1326

0.712
0.820

0.607
0.561

0.535

0.876

TRACK CLASSIFICATION
Higher vs. Lower

0.2086

1.232

0.0615

11.4958
11.4958

TRAIN SPEED
>30 mph vs. <=30 mph

0.3479

1.416

0.0639

29.6558
29.6558
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estimate in the logistic-regression analysis identified nine factors that were
significantly associated with accident risk change at highway-railroad grade
crossings after Stop-sign treatment: AADT, advanced warning, vehicle type, time
of day visibility, motorist action at the crossing, view of the tracks, injuries, track
classification, and train speed. All nine factors were significant at the p<0.01
level except for injuries, which were significant at p=0.02.
Parameter categories and specific comparisons between subcategories
for the significant factors can also be seen in Table 5. Subcategory comparisons
explain expected change in model results with variation within the parameter
category relative to a base subcategory. The sign on the estimate indicates the
slope of the model as influenced by the subcategory. The Odds Ratio compares
the expected results in one subcategory to another.
The odds ratio gives a measure of the propensity, or natural inclination,
found in the data, such as the inclination for the odds of an accident to increase
or decrease as AADT increases or decreases. Odds ratio is a measure of
relative risk compared to a base state, such as ≤ 500 vehicles per day for AADT.
For a discussion of odds and odds ratio, see Appendix 3.
Examination of odds ratios for AADT subcategories indicates that,
compared to Crossbucks-only, the propensity of an accident occurring at a Stopcontrolled crossing with 500-1,000 vehicles per day AADT is 18.5 percent less
(p= 0.0119) than when the AADT is less than or equal to 500 vehicles per day.
Accident propensity is 14 percent less when the AADT is greater than 1,000
vehicles per day (p= 0.0667). However, the inventory data indicate that most
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passive crossings in the target population have less than 500 vehicles per day.
The decreased propensity could be a result of the decreasing numbers of
crossings with AADT greater than 500 vehicles per day.
Stop-controlled crossings with posted advanced-warning signs showed a
15.7 percent decrease in the likelihood of accidents over crossings without
advanced-warning signs (p=0.0034). It is reasonable to expect a decrease in
accident propensity with advanced warning.
Two comparisons were made in the category of Vehicle Type. The first
compared accident propensity for trucks/buses to passenger cars and the
second compared the accident propensity for other vehicles to passenger cars.
At Stop-controlled crossings, the odds ratio for trucks/buses reflects an accident
propensity 20 percent less with passenger cars (p=0.0002). For other types of
vehicles there is essentially no difference in accident propensity with passenger
cars. The odds ratio was 0.99, not significant statistically (p=0.9438).
The Visibility (time of day) category describes the propensity for accidents
under different natural lighting conditions and traffic characteristic for those times
of day. In the Visibility category, the odds of an accident occurring was
compared for nighttime and dawn/dusk hours. Both subcategory comparisons
reflected that Stop signs had a benefit during these diminished visibility
conditions. Accident propensity during dawn/dusk hours reflected an 18 percent
less likelihood of crash than during daytime, but was only marginally significant at
p= 0.0725. During nighttime hours, accident propensity was 29 percent less than
daytime hours, and was significant at p< 0.0001. This seems reasonable as view
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of approaching trains is a greater problem during periods with no lighting. It
should be noted that no data was available regarding exposure during these
periods. The comparison was made as if the exposure were the same as that
experienced during daytime hours.
In the category of Motorist Action, the odds were compared for two unsafe
conditions, motorist-stopped-on-crossing (SOC) and those who reportedly did not
stop (DNS). The two categories were compared to the odds of an accident for
motorists who were reported to have stopped and then proceeded (STP). The
propensity for SOC crashes was 39 percent less at Stop controls, at a statistical
significance of p<0.0001. The propensity for DNS crashes was 44 percent less,
again at a significance of p<0.0001.
Stop signs require a motorist to stop at crossings, regardless of sightdistance visibility. However, Stop signs are not always posted when sight
distance is obstructed. The category of crossing Sight Distance included
subcategories of obstructed and unobstructed sight distance. The obstruction
could be from vegetation, buildings, topography or other interference with direct
view of the tracks.
Stop signs helped when obstructions were present; crash propensity was
46.5 percent less for obstructed sight distances compared to unobstructed
(p<0.0001). It is plausible that when motorists cannot see the tracks and are
totally dependent on the Stop sign, they show greater respect for the potentially
dangerous condition.
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Using non-injury accidents as a baseline reference for the Injuries
category, injury accident propensity was 12.4 percent less at Stop-sign-controlled
crossings (p=0.0245). This is an important finding. The indication is that injury
accidents or severe accidents are more likely to be experienced at Crossbuckonly crossings rather than Stop controlled crossings.
Track classifications correspond to train speeds (See Appendix 2) and
were grouped into two categories: lower (classes 1, 2, 3) and higher (classes 4,
5, 6). Lower track classifications require lower train speeds. As was expected, in
both categories accident propensity increased with higher train speed/track
classification. Both categories were statistically significant (p< 0.001).

4.2.2 Interaction Effects between Factors Contributing to Accident
Frequency Differences
After confirming the main-effect model, a second logistic-regression
analysis explored the possible significant interactions between factors and
identified several variables that reflected a significant interactive association
concerning accident frequencies (Table 6).
Four interaction effects of significance were identified between:
1. Visibility (time of day) and sight distance (obstruction) (p =0.0031)
2. Injury accidents and track classification (p = 0.0309)
3. Injury accidents and train speed (p =0.0161)
4. Advanced-warning signage and vehicle type (p = 0.0408)
Interactions 2 and 3 are equivalent as noted in section 4.2.1.
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Table 6: Interaction-effect model

Parameter

Intercept
AADT
>1000 vs. <=500
500-1000 vs. <=500
ADVANCED WARNING
Yes vs No
VEHICLE TYPE
Other vs. Car
Truck/Bus vs. Car
VISIBLTY (TIME OF DAY)
Night vs. Daytime
Dawn/Dusk vs. Daytime
MOTORIST ACTION
S.O.C. vs. S.T.P.
D.N.S. vs. S.T.P.
SIGHT DISTANCE
Obstructed vs. Not Obstructed
INJURIES
Injuries vs. None
TRACK CLASSIFICATION
Higher vs. Lower
TRAIN SPEED
>30 mph vs. <=30 mph
VISIBILITY & SIGHT DISTANCE
Night & Obstructed Sight Dist.
Dawn/Dusk & Obstructed Sight
Dist.
INJURIES & TRACK CLASS
Injuries & Higher Track Classes
INJURIES & TRAIN SPEED
Injuries & Train Speeds > 30 mph
ADVANCED WARNING &
VEHICLE
Advanced Warning & Other
Vehicles
Advanced Warning & Trucks/Buses

Estimate

Odds
Ratio

0.3354

Standard
Error

Wald
ChiSquare

Pr > ChiSq

0.1221

7.5433

0.006
0.0118
0.0463
0.0113
0.0001
0.0001
0.0003
0.2408
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0239
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0672
0.0672
<.0001
<.0001
0.0016
0.0016

-0.1652
-0.2065

0.848
0.813

0.0829
0.0815

-0.2822

0.754

0.0739

-0.2729
-0.418

0.761
0.658

0.2327
0.1041

-0.3796
-0.2584

0.684
0.772

0.0643
0.1144

-0.4953
-0.5703

0.609
0.565

0.1085
0.1002

-0.8459

0.429

0.138

-0.1833

0.833

0.1002

0.3068

1.359

0.0751

0.2413

1.273

0.0766

8.8736
3.9689
6.4179
14.5861
14.5861
16.3846
1.3756
16.1117
36.523
34.8105
5.1017
32.4299
20.8364
32.3956
37.5891
37.5891
3.349
3.349
16.6894
16.6894
9.9295
9.9295

-0.1308

0.8774
0.7065

0.3085

11.5799
8.099

0.0031
0.0044

5.0789
4.6587
4.6587
5.7909
5.7909

0.0242
0.0309
0.0309
0.0161
0.0161

6.3987

0.0408

2.0886
5.1575

0.1484
0.0231

-0.3475

0.432

-0.16

0.8521

0.1313

0.3842

1.4684

0.1356

-0.1427
-0.4162
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0.867
0.6595

0.2854
0.1251

The interaction results are illustrated graphically on Figures 17 through 20.
The baseline interaction factor odds ratio is a comparison to itself and represents
a relative risk equal to one. All other subcategories are compared to the baseline
interaction factor and represent the relative risk or propensity with respect to the
baseline odds ratio. When Stop signs are posted rather than Crossbucks-only, a
relative risk less than one indicates that accident propensity is less than the odds
of an accident occurring in the reference subcategory. A relative risk greater
than one indicates that the accident propensity is higher than the odds of an
accident occurring in the reference subcategory when Stop signs are posted.
Interaction between visibility (time of day) and sight distance (obstruction),
is displayed on Figure 17. In all natural lighting conditions for both obstructed
and unobstructed sight distance, the model reveals that Stop-controlled
crossings were enhanced. All subcategories had an accident propensity less
than the odds of an accident occurring in daylight visibility where sight distance
was not obstructed. This is an important finding inasmuch as Stop signs were
found to perform better than Crossbucks-only, on average, in the target
population, reflecting the findings in the statistical analysis of overall accident
experience.
Figure 18 indicates the relative risk of interactions between injury
accidents at lower and higher track classifications. The model reveals a lower
relative risk of injury accident occurring at all track classifications. However, the
relative risk of having a non-injury accident was found to be higher at higher track
classifications.
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Interaction between injuries and train speed is displayed on Figure 19.
The figure indicates accident propensity was less for injury accidents when train
speeds were less than or equal to 30 mph. When train speeds were greater than
30 mph, the propensity for accidents increased and had a higher relative risk
than crossings with non-injury accidents and train speeds less than 30 mph. This
finding reinforces the finding in the previous regression analysis that injury
accidents or severe accidents are more likely to be experienced at Crossbuckonly crossings, and, more specifically, when train speeds are greater than 30
mph.
Figure 20 shows interaction between advanced warning and vehicle type.
It compares accident propensity for subcategories of the Vehicle Type parameter
category with and without advanced warning signs posted. Figure 20 reveals
that all cases have a lower risk, relative to passenger vehicles at crossings with
no advanced warning signs posted.

4.3 Statistical Modeling of Accident Frequency
During analysis of the output, it was found that there is a difference in AADT
distribution for paved and unpaved roads at grade crossings in the target
population. Higher AADT is more likely at paved grade crossings. As reflected
on Figure 21, most unpaved-crossing accidents occur when AADT is less than
100 vehicles per day; most paved-crossing accidents occur when AADT is less
than 300 vehicles per day. Likewise, Eck and Shanmugam‟s study (7) reported
that low-volume-road grade-crossing characteristics are significantly different
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Figure 20: Interaction between advanced-warning signage and vehicle type
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Figure 21: Frequency of crashes on paved and unpaved roads by AADT
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from those of higher-volume-road grade crossings. Their study indicated that
sign impact on high-volume versus low-volume roads was more evident for
physical characteristics than for operational characteristics. Therefore two
separate models are appropriate.
In this study, negative-binomial models were developed separately for
paved and unpaved crossings in order to avoid a collinearity problem (44)
between crash frequency and certain independent factors described by Eck and
Shanmugam.(7)
Table 7 presents the significance tests of model parameters for both
paved and unpaved crossings. For the paved-crossing model, it is found that
control treatment, percent trucks, AADT, number of crossing tracks, development
type adjacent to crossing, and interaction terms between control treatment,
AADT, trains per day, percent trucks, and MAXTTSPD are significantly
associated with the accident rate at crossings. For the unpaved crossing model,
number of crossing tracks is not a significant parameter, but number of lanes is.
Furthermore, the unpaved crossing model shows fewer interaction terms than the
paved model. In Table 7, the measure of dispersion, ά, is 25.4 for the paved
model and 32.6 for the unpaved. Both dispersion measures are significantly
larger than one, displaying a very strong overdispersion effect, which means that
the NB regression is the appropriate model instead of the Poisson model.
Coefficient estimates of model parameters reflect how independent
variables are associated with accident risk at crossings: the mean number of
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Table 7: Parameter estimates of the negative-binomial regression models
Paved Grade Crossing
Model Parameter
Intercept
Control Treatment
(Stop sign vs. Crossbucks)
No. Traffic Lanes
Percent Trucks
(Continuous variable, %)
AADT
(Continuous variable, per
1000)
Trains per day
(Continuous variable)
No. Crossing Tracks
(Continuous variable)
MAXTTSPD
(Continuous variable, mph)
Development Type
Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Institutional
Open Space
Interactions
Control*AADT
Control*Trains
Control*Tracks
Control*MAXTTSPD
Dispersion
DF
Deviance
Log Likelihood

Unpaved Grade Crossing

Estimate

Standard
Error

p-value

Estimate

Standard
Error

p-value

-10.1719

0.5129

<.0001

-13.1098

0.8476

<.0001

-5.5172

0.7072

<.0001

-4.6330

0.4778

<.0001

-

-

-

1.1595

0.3169

0.0003

0.0491

0.0126

<.0001

-0.0491

0.0173

0.0045

0.4075

0.0934

<.0001

3.1523

1.2665

0.0128

0.0200

0.0223

0.3691

-0.0327

0.0183

0.0730

1.3169

0.2088

<.0001

-

-

-

-0.0200

0.0103

0.0509

0.0735

0.0118

<.0001

0.2206
-0.2331
1.2587
-1.7452
0.0000

0.2584
0.3746
0.4313
0.9256
0.0000

0.3934
0.5336
0.0035
0.0594
-

-1.4561
-0.3511
3.0052
-1.6280
0.0000

0.4140
0.8918
0.7447
3.3528
0.0000

0.0004
0.6938
<.0001
0.6273
-

0.6322
0.1103
-0.5472
0.0891
25.4236

0.1778
0.0310
0.2911
0.0155
0.6126
7841
0.7084
-10189.1227

0.0004
0.0004
0.0602
<.0001

0.1346
32.5502
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0.0241
1.0876
5236
0.5455
-5841.5960

<.0001
-

expected accidents increases (if coefficient is positive) or decreases (if coefficient
is negative) when the value of the independent variable increases. The effects of
risk factors on crossing safety are explained for paved and unpaved crossing
models, respectively, as follows.

4.3.1 Paved-Crossing Model
The coefficient of the variable Control Treatment is -5.517 for the paved
model. The coefficient indicates that the average number of accidents is
significantly reduced after Stop signs were installed. This result is consistent with
the previous finding in the statistical analysis of overall accident experience
wherein the accident rate at Crossbucks-controlled crossings is significantly
higher than that at Stop-controlled crossings. However, the modeling results
show that the Stop-sign effect on safety performance at paved crossings is
complexly interacted with AADT, trains per day, percent trucks, and MAXTTSPD.
To better explain the interaction effects, the modeling results from Table 7
were further expressed by Equations 5 and 6 for Crossbuck-only and Stop-sign
control, respectively:
For Crossbucks-only control:

 X  exp {-10.172 + 0.049 (Percent Trucks) + 0.408 (AADT)
+ 0.020 (Trains per Day) + 1.317 (No. of Crossing Tracks)
- 0.020 MAXTTSPD + [0.221(Residential) - 0.233(Commercial)
+ 1.259(Industrial) - 1.745(Institutional)]}
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(Eq. 5)

For Stop-sign control:

 S  exp { -15.689 + 0.049 (Percent Trucks) + 1.039 (AADT)
+ 0.130 (Trains per Day) + 0.770 (No. of Crossing Tracks)
+ 0.069 MAXTTSPD + [0.221(Residential) - 0.233(Commercial)
+ 1.259(Industrial) - 1.745(Institutional)]}

(Eq. 6)

In both Equations 5 and 6, the positive coefficients for AADT and Trains
per Day indicate that accident frequencies at crossings increase as the number
of trains per day increases and as AADT increases by 1000 vehicles per day.
These findings are consistent with many previous research results in crossingaccident frequency-modeling studies.(43, 44, 48)
The coefficients of AADT and Trains per Day in Equation 6 are larger than
those in Equation 5, which indicates that the increasing rate of accident risk with
increments of AADT and trains per day is larger when the crossings were
controlled by Stop signs compared to when they were controlled by Crossbucks
only. This finding supports the previous research conclusion drawn by Eck and
Shanmugam (7): Stop-sign treatment is more effective at lower-volume-road
grade-crossings than at higher-volume-road grade crossings, over the range of
volumes associated with passive-control crossings.
The interaction effect between control treatment and number of crossing
tracks is marginally significant (p=0.0602). When an additional track is present at
a crossing, a vehicle-train accident was e1.317 times more likely to occur if the
crossing had been controlled by Crossbucks only. A vehicle-train accident was
e0.770 times more likely to occur if the crossing had been controlled by Stop sign.
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Accident frequency increases with an increase in the number of crossing tracks
and is larger for Crossbucks-only-controlled crossings than for Stop-controlled
crossings. This implies that Stop-sign treatment is more effective at crossings
with multiple tracks.
Although maximum timetable speeds are expressed in increments, the
model shows that an increase in maximum timetable speed (MAXTTSPD) of one
mile per hour is expected to increase accident frequency by e0.069 times at Stopcontrolled crossings but decrease accident frequency by e0.020 times at
Crossbuck-only-controlled crossings. This interaction effect between Control
Treatment and MAXTTSPD shows that higher train speeds would reduce the
effectiveness of the Stop-sign treatment.
The positive sign of the coefficient for Percent Trucks indicates that as the
percentage of trucks in traffic increases, there is a corresponding increase in
accident frequency. There is no difference between the two treatment methods.
Trucks can be 40 or more times heavier than other vehicles in the traffic stream
and large trucks are generally less maneuverable, accelerate slower, and take
longer to stop.(45) Due to physical and operational characteristics of these
heavy trucks, they can significantly impact traffic system performance and safety.
Also, many trucks are required to stop at crossings by law or operating-company
policy.
Development Types were treated as a single categorical variable with five
subcategories; Open Space was selected as the reference category. Compared
to crossings in Open Space, the crash frequency of crossings in Industrial areas
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is e0.069 times higher (p=0.0035), while crash rates for crossings at Residential
(p=0.3934), Commercial (p = 0.5336), and Institutional areas (p=0.0594) are not
significantly different. These results are reasonable and further support the utility
of the model.

4.3.2 Unpaved-Crossing Model
The coefficient of the variable Control Treatment is -4.6330 in the unpaved
model. Similar to the effect illustrated in the paved model, the accident
frequency in the unpaved model is also significantly reduced after Stop signs
were installed. The modeling results are further expressed in Equations 7 and 8
for Crossbucks-only control and Stop-sign control, respectively:
For Crossbucks-only control:

 X = exp{-13.110 + 1.160 (No. Traffic Lanes) - 0.049 (Percent Trucks)
+3.152 (AADT) - 0.033 (Trains per Day) + 0.074 MAXTTSPD
+ [-1.456(Residential) - 0.3511(Commercial) + 3.005(Industrial)
- 1.628(Institutional)]}

(Eq. 7)

For Stop-sign control:

 S = exp{-17.742 +1.160 (No. Traffic Lanes) - 0.049 (Percent Trucks)
+ 3.152 (AADT) + 0.101 (Trains per Day) + 0.074 MAXTTSPD
+ [-1.456(Residential) - 0.3511(Commercial) + 3.005(Industrial)
- 1.628(Institutional)]}

(Eq. 8)

In the unpaved model, number of Trains per Day is the only variable which
has a significant interaction effect with Control Treatment. The coefficient of
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Trains per Day in Equation 7 is negative (-0.033) and in Equation 8 is positive
(0.101). This means that as the number of trains per day increases, crash
frequency on unpaved roads increases at Stop-controlled crossings, but
decreases at Crossbucks-controlled crossings. This result implies that Stop-sign
treatments are less effective at crossings with higher train volumes on unpaved
roads. This is consistent with the findings for the paved-crossings model at
higher train volumes.
Although multiple-lane unpaved roads are not common, the specific
coefficient estimate (1.1595) reported in Table 7 indicates that an increased
number of unpaved lanes crossing tracks results in an increased accident
frequency (0.0003). One possible explanation is, when a wide unpaved road is
treated as multiple-lane roadway by drivers, vehicles stopped in order to yield to
an oncoming train at the crossing may be a temporary sight obstruction for
drivers in the adjacent (virtual) lane, thus leading to potential accident risk.
In the unpaved model, AADT is positively correlated with accident
frequency, as in the paved model. Higher traffic volumes result in higher crash
frequencies.
As shown in Table 7, on unpaved roads, it was found that accident
frequency will decrease slightly if the percentage of trucks and MAXTTSPD
increase. This finding seems not to be intuitive because more trucks in traffic
and higher train speed are generally considered as risk factors for crossing
safety. A possible explanation for the modeling results is that for the unpaved
crossings with higher train speed and truck volume, engineers realize their
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potential risk and take protective actions to enhance crossing safety, such as
clearing sight obstructions, increasing sign visibility, or applying additional
warning information.
Adjacent Development Type is also associated with crash frequency at
unpaved crossings. Compared to crossings in Open Space, the proximity of
crossings to Industrial areas leads to a much higher number of accidents
(p<0.0001), which is consistent with the analysis in the paved model. An
interesting finding is that the proximity of unpaved crossings to Residential areas
is associated with a lower number of accidents (p=0.0004). A presumable
explanation is that most of the road users in residential areas are local drivers
who are familiar with the surroundings and the crossings. Crash rates for
crossings at Commercial (p=0.6938) and Institutional areas (p=0.6273) are not
statistically significant.

4.3.3 Negative-Binomial Accident-Prediction Models
Two models were developed for paved highway-rail grade crossings
(Equations 11 and 12) and two for unpaved highway-rail grade crossings
(Equations 13 and 14) from attributes and accident records of target grade
crossings upgraded from Crossbucks to Stop signs since 1980. The primary
purpose for the development of the four models is to synthesize the records of
Stop-sign performance over the study period in order to determine if there is a
limitation on the safety performance range to be expected for Stop signs versus
Crossbuck-only.
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The models provide insight into the safety performance expected at the
target crossings and can be used in evaluation of accident risk. A new and
unique set of curves for each crossing can be generated by adjusting specific
values for the variables. This set of curves can be used to evaluate the range of
effectiveness for each different crossing configuration. Additionally, the models
can be used by the highway-rail community to examine and manage existing
crossings, assess potential crossings for upgrade, and plan and design crossings
as parameter values change over time.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

This research in accident safety at public highway-railroad grade
crossings focused on crossings that were upgraded to Stop controls from
Crossbucks-only. The analysis compared accidents and accident frequencies in
the same population of crossings since 1980, during both Crossbuck- and Stopcontrol phases. Private and pedestrian crossings and grade-separated crossings
were excluded.

5.1 Statistical Analysis of Overall Accident Experience
This study focused on a 26-year accident history of passive highwayrailroad grade crossings that were originally controlled by Crossbucks-only and
were later upgraded to Stop controls. The first objective of the research was to
assess the effectiveness of the Stop-sign treatment on crossing safety.
Annual accident frequencies for both Crossbuck control and Stop control
were calculated and compared to test the hypothesis regarding Stop-sign usage
safety at grade crossings. The null hypothesis for the statistical analysis of
overall accident experience was that there is no difference in accident
frequencies at highway-railroad grade crossings controlled by Crossbucks-only
or by Stop signs. The results indicated that the null hypothesis was false and
was therefore rejected.
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It was found that annual accident frequencies during the period when
crossings were controlled by Stop sign were consistently lower than previously
when they were controlled by Crossbucks-only. This finding supports the claim
that Stop-sign treatment is an effective method for improving safety at public
grade crossings. This conclusion is consistent with prior accident-rate analysis
for Stop-sign usage at passive crossings.(7, 9)

5.2 Accident Propensity Comparison
The second part of the research used logistic-regression modeling to
examine accident-attribute frequencies of the target population. Having
established that Stop-controlled crossings showed significant improvement in the
safety record over the use of Crossbucks only, the objective was to evaluate the
propensity for accidents in the target population and the expected safety impact
of adding Stop signs.
A logit model was used to compare the propensity of motorists to
experience accidents at these two types of passive railroad-grade crossing
treatments. Results of the logistic regression were reported according to the
main effect of various factors and variations of those factors. An additional
analysis of interaction effects was made to determine relationships between
factors that had significance. The odds ratio was examined to evaluate the
difference in accident propensity. The main-effect model surfaced nine
significant factors. A second regression found four significant interaction factors.
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5.3 Statistical Modeling of Accident Frequency
Thirdly, this study developed negative-binomial accident prediction models
to evaluate accident counts for highway-rail grade-crossings that include the
effect of Stop-sign treatment. During model development, data was divided into
paved and unpaved crossings and a negative-binomial regression was run for
both crossing types. Model results were tabulated and four accident-prediction
equations were generated.
The model results corresponded to the statistical analysis of overall
accident experience that Stop-sign treatment reduced accident frequency.
Through evaluating the factors affecting safety at passive crossings based on the
negative-binomial models, the following conclusions applicable to the study‟s
target population can be drawn.
At paved highway-rail grade crossings:
1. Accident frequencies increase as AADT, percentage of trucks, number
of trains per day, and number of tracks increase.
2. Stop-sign treatment is more effective at low-volume vehicle and train
crossings.
3. Stop-sign treatment is more effective at crossings with multiple tracks.
4. Higher train speeds reduce the effectiveness of Stop-sign treatment.
5. Accident frequencies increase in proximity to industrial areas.
At unpaved highway-rail grade crossings:
1. Stop-sign treatment is less effective at higher train volumes.
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2. Accident frequencies increase as AADT and the number of highway
lanes increase.
3. Accident frequencies decrease in proximity to residential areas.
4. Accident frequencies increase in proximity to industrial areas.

5.4 Study Limits and Recommendations
Certain limitations of this study should be discussed. Goodness-of-fit for
the models showed that deviance values are not very close to one (see Table 7),
which indicates model misspecification to some extent. One possible
explanation is that the FRA Grade-Crossing Inventory database may neglect
various important factors associated with crossing accident risk resulting in such
factors affecting the model. For example, sight distance as an important
engineering factor is not recorded in the Grade-Crossing Inventory although one
primary consideration for using a Stop sign is limited sight distance at a crossing
(3) and restricted sight distance was identified as a significant risk factor in
previous crossing studies.(43, 44) Another possible explanation is that the model
fitting was based on crossings across the entire United States and, therefore,
crossing design attributes, environmental features, and driver characteristics are
not as homogenous as those in local crossing databases, thus leading to a larger
variation of accident frequency.
The results of this research are significant, but they do not indicate that all
passive at-grade crossings should be Stop-controlled. Additional research
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should be conducted on crossings that were always Crossbucks-controlled and
on crossings that were always Stop-controlled. These crossings may represent
two entirely different levels of danger and may operate differently from crossings
that were upgraded.
The research reported herein addresses the issues of Stop-sign effects on
train-vehicle accidents in the target population of crossings. The NCHRP Report
470 (3) points out that another critical concern of the use of Stop signs is the
possible increment of vehicle-vehicle crashes, especially rear-end types. Limited
by research scope and data availability, this study focused only on vehicle-train
accidents and did not assess the effect of Stop-sign treatment on non-trainrelated crashes. It is strongly recommended that further studies be conducted to
address this issue.
Raub and Lucke (4) did note within their study area that “there was a
substantial variation in collision frequencies among the states for a given class of
device”. It does seem reasonable that regional differences would exist, as well.
Additional research is recommended to evaluate Stop-sign efficiency and
attributes of significance, generating potentially different prediction models for
different areas of the country.
It is recommended that the models generated in part three of this research
be used to evaluate existing crossings in their current configuration as well as in
potential configuration changes. Those crossings that fall within the beneficial
performance range should then be upgraded. Based on specific attributes of the
current Crossbuck-only-controlled crossings, decision makers and traffic
81

engineers can use the models to examine accident risks at crossings and assess
the potential effectiveness of Stop-sign treatment. This risk-evaluation process
may help mitigate crossing accident hazards before vehicle-train accidents occur.
Finally, Stop-sign installations at highway-railroad grade crossings have
shown a definite benefit according to the accident record since 1980. The
research conducted herein has proved in three different ways that Stop-sign
installation safety performance is superior to Crossbucks-only in the target
population. The ISTEA mandate to allow usage of Stop signs at highway-railroad
grade-crossings has been shown to be correct.
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Appendix 1: FRA Grade-Crossing Inventory Data Definitions
VARIABLE NAME

DESCRIPTION

CROSSING

Crossing No.

EFFDATE

Effective Date

EDATE

End Date

REASON

Reason for Update

STATE

State

CNTYCD

County

STATE2

State

CITYCD

City

NEAREST
RAILROAD

BRANCH
MILEPOST

In or Near City
Railroad Operating
Company
RR Division
RR Subdivision
Highway type and No.
Street or Road Name
RR I.D. No.
Nearest RR Timetable
Station
Branch or Line Name
RR Milepost

MAPREF

County Map Ref. No.

TYPEXING

Type of Crossing

POSXING

Position of Crossing

PRVCAT

Private Xing Category

PRVIND

Signs/ Signals

RRDIV
RRSUBDIV
HIGHWAY
STREET
RRID
TTSTN

ENTERED AS
Valid Crossing I.D. No. Must be 6 numeric characters
followed by 1alphabetic character.
Entered in form as MM/DD/YYYY (stored in EFFDATE field
as YYMMDD)
End date for the most current record is always '999999'.
When the crossing is updated with a new record, the end
date of the previous current record is set to one day before
the effective date of the new current record. EDATE is
stored as YYMMDD.
1=Changes in Existing Crossing Data, 2=New Crossing,
3=Closed Crossing or Abandoned
Use 2-character state code. Click here to go to Valid State
FIPS Code .
Use 4-character county code. Click here to go to Valid
County FIPS Code
Use 2-character state code. Click here to go to Valid State
FIPS Code
Use 4-character city code. Click here to go to Valid City
FIPS Code
0 = In City 1=Near City
Valid Railroad Code For valid railroad codes, refer to current
list of railroad codes provided by FRA Office of Safety
Railroad Division Name or Blank
Railroad Subdivision or Blank
Any Alphanumeric Data or Blank
Any Alphanumeric Data or Blank
Valid Timetable Station
Branch/Line Name or Blank
The first two spaces can be alphanumeric, and the next four
spaces numeric. There is an implied decimal point after the
first 4 characters.
Any Alphanumeric Data or Blank 1=Pedestrian, 2=Private
Vehicle, 3=Public Vehicle (The following is the key for the
crossing type and position:
11 - Pedestrian at grade
12 - Pedestrian RR under 13 - Pedestrian RR over
21 - Private at grade
22 - Private RR under
23 - Private RR over
31 - Public at grade
32 - Public RR under
33 - Public RR over)
1=At grade under
2=RR Under
3=RR over
1=Farm
2=Residential 3=Recreational 4=Industrial
5=Commercial
Current Values:
1=signs
2=signals
3=no signs or signals
4=both signs and signals On Previous Version of Inventory
Form:
8=Signs 9=Signals 0=None
Any Alphanumeric Data
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VARIABLE NAME

DESCRIPTION

PRVSIGN
INIT

Signs-Specify
Initiating Agency

BATCH

System coded Field

USERCD
UPDATE

LINK
DAYTHRU
DAYSWT

NGHTTHRU
NGHTSWT
LT1MOV

MAXTTSPD
MINSPD
MAXSPD
MAINTRK
OTHRTRK
OTHRDES
SEPIND

SEPRR
SAMEIND

SAMERR
WDCODE

Day Thru Train
Movements
Switching

Night Thru Train
Movements
Night Switching
Movements
Less Than One
Movement Per Day?
Maximum Timetable
Speed
From Min:
To Max:
Main
Other
Specify
Does Another RR
Operate a Separate Trk.
(Y/N)?
Specify
Does Another RR
Operate Over Your Trk.
(Y/N)?
Specify
Warning Device Code

ENTERED AS
(Reference Field 140, PRVSIGNL)
1. =Railroad 2. =State 3.=DOT 4. =Original FRA internal
use. Note: 3 & 4 are for internal FRA use only.
Coded field, which is used for batch identification during
update: The first character is the last character of the year;
The second-fourth characters are the day of the year, and
the fifth-sixth characters are the sequence number.
This field is not currently used No Longer Used Previous:
Coded date of update.
Refer to field 105 (UPDATDAT) Not in use1.Used for High
Speed Corridor.. Previous Value: 2.This was the link
identification code (LIC) from the rail network model for the
line on which the crossing lies. The LIC is a five-digit code
incorporating the alphabetical abbreviation of the owning
railroad and a sequence number.
Refer to field 89 (HSCORRID)
0 to 99(Previous Values: 0 to 99) Not in New Form-field No
Longer Maintained in Inventory-obsolete
(Reference Field135, TOTALTRN, and Field 136
TOTALSWT) (Previous Values: 0 to 99) Not in New Formfield No Longer Maintained in Inventory-obsolete
(Previous Values: 0 to 99) Not in New Form-field No Longer
Maintained in Inventory-obsolete
(Reference Field 135, TOTALTRN, and Field 136
TOTALSWT)
0 = At least one train per day1= Less than one train per day
Enter a check if train frequency is less than one train per
day.
Values are 1 to 150
Values are 1 to 150
Values are 1 to 150
Values are 0 to 9 for main track
Values are 0 to 99 for other tracks
Description, if other tracks exist
1=Yes 2=No

Up to 4 valid RR codes Code should not be repeated
1=Yes 2=No

Up to 4 valid RR codes Code should not be repeated
Highway warning device class at crossing. New Values: 1 No signs or signals2 - Other signs or signals3 - Crossbucks4
- Stop signs5 - Special Active Warning Devices6 - Highway
traffic signals, wigwags, bells, or other activated7. Flashing
lights8 - All other Gates9 - Four Quad (full barrier)
Gates(Note: SPECPRO (Field 64) has WDCODE=6; and
WARNACTO (Field 142) has WDCODE=6).: Previous
Values1 - No sign or signal2 - Other signs or signals3 - Stop
signs4 - Crossbucks5 - Non-train activated special
protection6 - Highway traffic signals, wigwags, or bells7 Flashing lights8 - Gates(Previous Values: 0 to 9) Not in New
Form-field No Longer Maintained in Inventory-obsolete
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VARIABLE NAME

DESCRIPTION

ENTERED AS

XBUCKRF

CrossbucksReflectorized

(Reference Field 138, XBUCK) (Previous Values: 0 to 9) Not
in New Form-field No Longer Maintained in Inventoryobsolete

XBUCKNRF

(Reference Field 138, XBUCK)

STOPSTD
STOPOTH

Crossbucks-Nonreflectorized
Highway Stop Signs
Other Stop Sign

OTHSGN1
OTHDES1
OTHSGN2
OTHDES2

Other Signs:
Specify:
Other Signs:
Specify:

GATERW

Gates-Red & White

GATEOTH
FLASHOV

FLASHOTH

Gates-Other
Cantilevered (or bridged)
Flashing Lights- Over
Traffic Lane
Cantilevered (or bridged)
Flashing Lights- Not over
Traffic
Mast Mounted Flashing
Lights:
Other Flashing Lights:

FLASHDES
HWYSGNL
WIGWAGS
BELLS
SPECPRO
NOSIGNS

Specify:
Hwy. Traffic Signals
Wigwags
Bells
Specify Warning Device:
No Signs or Signals

COMPOWER

Commercial Power
Available (Y/N)?
Signaling for Train
Operation: Is Track
Equipped with Train
Signals

FLASHNOV

FLASHMAS

SGNLEQP

0 to 99 represents 9 or more
Previous Values: ( 0 to 9, 9 represents 9 or more) Not in
New Form-field No Longer Maintained in Inventory-obsolete
Conversion: If at least one of the two “Other Signs: Specify”
field sets (OTHSGN1 and OTHDES1, or OTHSGN2 and
OTHDES2) are blank, the value for STOPOTH (Other Stop
Sign) was placed in the blank OTHSGN1 (or OTHSGN2)
field, and “OTHRSTPSGN” was entered in the
corresponding OTHDES1 (or OTHDES2) field.
0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more
Any Alphanumeric Description
0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more
Any Alphanumeric Description Previous Values: 0 to 9 ( 9
represents 9 or more) Not in New Form-field No Longer
Maintained in Inventory-obsolete
(Reference Field 139, GATES) (Previous Values: 0 to 9, ( 9
represents 9 or more) Not in New Form-field No Longer
Maintained in Inventory-obsolete
(Reference Field 139, GATES)
0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more

0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more

0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more
0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more
Any Alphanumeric Description
0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more
0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more
0 to 9 9 represents 9 or more
Description of Non-train Activated Device
Enter a check if no signs or signals are present. 0=At least
one sign or signal
1=No signs or signals
1=Yes 2=No
1=Yes 2=No
New Values:
1= Constant Warning Time
2= Motion Detectors
3=DC/AFO
4=other
5=none
(Previous Values:
1=Yes
2=No,
3=N/A)
Conversion: Yes (1) CWT (1) No (2)-> DC/AFO(3) N/A (3)->
None (5)
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VARIABLE NAME

DESCRIPTION

SPSEL

Train Detection

DEVELTYP

Type of Development

HWYPVED
DOWNST

Is Highway Paved?
Does Track Run Down a
Street (Y/N)?
Pavement Markings:

PAVEMRK

HWYNEAR

XANGLE

Nearby Intersecting
Highway?
RR Advance Warning
Signs
Smallest Crossing Angle

SURFACE

Crossing Surface:

TRAFICLN

No. of Traffic Lanes
Crossing RR:
Are Truck Pullout Lanes
Present (Y/N)?
Is crossing on State

ADVWARN

TRUCKLN
STHWY1

ENTERED AS
(Previous: Does Xing Signal Provide Speed Selection for
Trains?) Values are 1 to 5
1=Open Space 2=Residential 3=Commercial 4=Industrial
5=Institutional
1=Yes 2=No
1=Yes 2=No
Values are 1 to 4
1=Stop lines,
2=RR Xing Symbols,
3=No Markings
4=Stop lines and RR Xing Symbols
New Values:
1=Less than 75ft
2=75 to 200ft
3=200 to 500 ft
4=N/A
Previous Values:
1=Yes 2=No
Conversion:
Yes >Less than 75 ft.
No >N/A
(See Field 152, HWYNRSIG)
1=Yes2=No
1 to 3 (measurement is in degrees)
1=0-29
2=30-59
3=60-90
Conversion:
New:
1. Timber
2. Asphalt
3. Asphalt & Flange
4. Concrete
5. Concrete and Rubber
6. Rubber
7. Metal
8. Unconsolidated
9. Other (Specify)
Old:
1. Sectional Treated Timber
2.Full Wood Plank
3.Asphalt
4.Concrete Slab
5.Concrete Pavement
6.Rubber
7.Metal Sections
8.Other Metal
9.Unconsolidated
0.Other (Specify)
(See Field 151, XSUROTHR)
Values are 1 to 9
1=Yes
2=No
1=Yes
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VARIABLE NAME
HWYSYS

DESCRIPTION
Highway System (Y/N)?
Highway System:

HWYCLASS

Functional Classification
of Road at Crossing:

AADT
PCTTRUK
LATITUDE

AADT
Estimate Percent Trucks:
Latitude

LONGITUD

Longitude

LLSOURCE

Lat/Long Source

INTRPRMP

Interconnection /Preemption

HUMPSIGN

Hump Signs

HSCORRID

[High Speed] Corridor ID
Code

DOTACPD
ACPDDATE
ACCCNT1
ACCCNT2
ACCCNT3
ACCCNT4
ACCCNT5
HISTDATE
SCHLBUS

DATE

DATE
Avg. No of School Buses
Passing Over the
Crossing on a School
Day

ENTERED AS
2=No
01=Interstate National Highway System
02=Other National Highway System
03=Other Federal-Aid Highway-Not NHS) 08=Non FederalAid (NHS=National Highway System)
01, 02, 06, 07, 08, 09, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19
01=R. Interstate,
02=R. Oth. Prin. Arterial, 06=R. Minor Arterial,
07=R. Major Collector, 08=R. Minor Collector, 09=R. Local,
11=U. Interstate,
12=U. Oth. Freeway and Expressway,
14=U. Oth. Prin. Arterial, 16=U. Minor Arterial,
17=U. Collector,
19=U. Local [R=Rural, U=Urban]
000001 – 999999 Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT)
00 – 99 Estimate of % of Trucks
Grade crossing latitudinal coordinate, from the center of the
crossing.
Grade crossing longitudinal coordinate, from the center of
the crossing.
1 = actual
2=estimated
Blank=neither
3. Federal Actual
4. Federal Derived –[For FRA Internal Use]
New values:
0 = not interconnected
1 = simultaneous preemption
2 = advance preemption
9 = n/a
Previous values:
0 = not interconnected
1 = interconnected
2 = simultaneous preemption
3 = advance preemption
9 = n/a)
Conversion:
1. (Interconnected)->1(simultaneous pre.)
2. (simulta. Pre.)->1(simultaneous pre.)
3. (adv.pre.)->2(adv pre.)
Is Hump crossing sign is installed?
1=Yes
2=No
3=Unknown
Code must be in High Speed Corridor Table (obtain from
FRA)
DOT Accident Prediction Value
Indicates when DOT ACPD was generated.
Accident history – current complete year
Accident history – prior year
Accident history – two years prior
Accident history – three years prior
Accident history – four years prior
Indicates when ACCCNT1- ACCCNT5 were generated
Value must be 0 through 999
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VARIABLE NAME

DESCRIPTION

WHISTBAN

New: Whistle Ban (Quiet
Zone)

PASSCD

Type of Passenger
Service

PASSCNT

Avg Passenger Train
Count Per Day
Parent RR
Crossing Owner

RRMAIN
XINGOWNR
SOURCE

UPDATDAT

DATE

LONGBDAT

DATE

LONGEDAT

DATE

FOURQUAD

Four-quadrant gates
present
Two-quadrant gates
present
Private Crossing-Public
Access
Railroad Use

TWOQUAD
OPENPUB
RRNARR1
RRNARR2
RRNARR3
RRNARR4
STNARR1
STNARR2
STNARR3
STNARR4
AADTYEAR
AADTCALC
TRAINDAT

Railroad Use
Railroad Use
Railroad Use
State Use
State Use
State Use
State Use
Year for AADT

TRAINCAL

RESERVE1

Reserved for Future Use

ENTERED AS
Valid values:
0=no
1=24 hour
2=partial
9=unknown
Valid values:
A = AMTRAK operates over crossing
FLASHDES Specify: 9 C 269 (277) Any Alphanumeric
Description
B = AMTRAK and other passenger train operates over
crossing
C = Other passenger train operates over crossing including
Seasonal
D = None
Value must be 0 through 999. [Cannot exceed the total train
movements]
Valid Railroad Code
Valid Railroad or Company Code This field will indicate the
source of the last update.
Valid values:
H = other hard copy
I = inventory form
M = other magnetic media
P = mass-update printout
T = magnetic tape
X = GX
O = foreign files
This field will contain the date that the last update to the
record was posted.
This field will contain the same date as the field EFFDATE,
in this file, except that the year will be four characters in this
data element.
This field will contain the same date as the field EDATE, in
this file, except that the year will be four characters in this
data element
1=Yes 2=No
NOT USED IN NEW FORM
1=Yes 2=No Blank=Unknown
These fields will contain whatever the railroad desires to
enter.

These fields will contain whatever the State desires to enter.

This field will contain the year of the last AADT update.
Not used.
Not currently used. Was to contain the year of the last trains
update.
Not used. (This field was to identify how the last trains
update was calculated:
1 = actual
2 = estimated
Blank = neither)
Reserved for future use. (RESERVE1 is 1 C. RESERVE2,
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VARIABLE NAME

DESCRIPTION

ENTERED AS
RESERVE3, RESERVE4, and RESERVE5 are 3 C each.)

RESERVE2
RESERVE3
RESERVE4
RESERVE5
DOTCASPD
DOTFATPD
FUNCCAT

Reserved for Future Use
Reserved for Future Use
Reserved for Future Use
Reserved for Future Use

RRCONT

Railroad Contact

HWYCONT

State Contact

POLCONT

Emergency Contact

NARR
TOTALTRN

Narrative
Total Trains

DOT Predicted Casualty Rate
DOT Predicted Fatality Rate
Not Used.

TOTALSWT
ENSSIGN
XBUCK

ENS Sign
Crossbucks

GATES
PRVSIGNL

Gates
Signals -Specify

FLASHPAI

Number of flashing light
pairs
Other Train Activated
Warning Devices
Channelization Devices
with Gates

WARNACTO
CHANNEL

XINGADJ
XNGADJNO

ILLUMINA
HWYSPEED
CNTYNAM
TTSTNNAM
CITYNAM
XSUROTHR
HWYNRSIG

Adjacent Xing with
separate no.?
Adjacent Xing with
separate no.? Provide
no.
Is Xing Illuminated?
Posted Hwy Speed
County
Nearest RR Timetable
Station
City
Crossing Surface:
Other Nearby
Intersecting Highway? Is
it signalized?

This field contains the telephone number of the railroad
contact associated with the crossing.
This field contains the telephone number of the State
highway contact associated with the crossing.
This field contains the telephone number of the emergency
contact associated with the crossing. Normally, this will be
the ENS telephone number posted at the crossing or along
the railroad branch line.
No editing will be done on this field
0-500 Conversion: TOTALTRN = ( DAYTHRU + DAYSWT +
NGHTTHRU + NGHTSWT )
0-500
Conversion: TOTALSWT = DAYSWT + NGHTSWT
1 = Yes 2 = No
Conversion: XBUCK = XBUCKRF + XBUCKNRF
Conversion: GATES = GATERW + GATEOTH
Conversion: If PRVIND = 2 then previous PRVSIGN value
will be moved to PRVSGNL. (Refer to field 24 (PRVSIGN)
This field contains the number of flashing light pairs.
This field contains other train activated warning devices.
1=All Approaches
2=One Approach
3=None
1=Yes
2=No
Valid crossing number

1=Yes
2=No
This field contains the posted highway speed.
Valid County Name
Valid Timetable Station name
Valid City Name
Specify Other Crossing Surface
1=Yes
2=No
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Appendix 2: Track Classification
Classes of track are defined in the Federal Track Safety Standards (49
CFR Part 213). See 49 CFR 213.4 and 213.9. Excepted track should be entered
as Class X.

Maximum Speed
Track Class

Freight Trains

Passenger Trains

X
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
10
25
40
60
80
110
125
160
200

Prohibited
15
30
60
80
90
110
125
160
200
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Appendix 3: Odds and Odds Ratio
Probabilities and odds are natural ways to quantify the chances of an
event happening. The odds of an event is the expected number of times an
event will occur to the expected number of times it will not occur.(45) Therefore,
probability and odds are related as shown in Equations 3-1 and 3-2:

O

p
1 p

(Eq. 3-1)

p

O
1 O

(Eq. 3-2)

Where:
O = Odds of an event
p = Probability of an event
1-p

= Probability of event not occurring
The odds compare the probability of an accident occurring at a Stop sign

compared to Crossbuck for a given category. For example, the odds of an
accident occurring at a stop sign (compared to a Crossbuck) when the AADT is ≤
500 vehicles per day, or the odds of an accident occurring at a Stop sign
(compared to a Crossbuck) when the AADT is >1000 vehicles per day.
Consider Equation 3-2 in regard to the two passive controls being
evaluated. If the numerator is the probability of an event occurring, then the
denominator is the probability of an event not occurring at a Stop sign which
means at a Crossbuck–only crossing. For example, if the event being
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considered is accidents that occurred during the daytime, the odds measures the
probability of daytime accidents to occur at Stop signs compared to Crossbucksonly.
This brings us to the odds ratio, a widely used measure of the relationship
between dichotomous variables.(45) It is simply the odds of an event for one
category divided by the odds of the event for another category. For example, in
Equation 3-3 the odds of an accident occurring in the daylight compared to the
odds of an accident occurring at night, for Stop signs compared to Crossbucksonly.

 p Sd   p Sd

 
1

p
p
Sd 
OddsRatio  
  Xd
 p Sn   p Sn

 
1

p
Sn 

 p Xn

  p Sd 
 

p
   Sn 
  p Xd 
 

p
  Xn 

(Eq. 3-3)

Where:
OddsRatio= measure of the relationship between daytime/nighttime accidents for
Stop- and Crossbuck-only controlled crossings

pSd = Probability of an accident occurring during daylight at a Stop sign
pSn = Probability of an accident occurring during night at a Stop sign
pXd = Probability of an accident occurring during daylight at a
Crossbuck-only
pXn = Probability of an accident occurring during night at a Crossbuckonly
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The odds ratio compares the odds of an accident occurring for different
sub categories, i.e., the propensity for an accident in one subcategory compared
to another subcategory. For example, the odds of an accident occurring at a
Stop sign when the AADT is >1000 vehicles per day compared to the odds of an
accident occurring at a Stop sign, when the odds for each category are described
as illustrated above.

100

Appendix 4: Poisson Model and Negative-Binomial Model
The most widely used model for count data analysis is Poisson
regression. The Poisson probability model is shown in Equation 4-1. In this
research it is interpreted as the probability, P (ki), of having a specified number
(count) of accidents (k) at a specific crossing (i) during the control period ( t ) in
which the crossing was either Crossbuck- or Stop-controlled.
e  i i
Pk i  
ki !

ki

(Eq. 4-1)

Where:
ki = A variable indicating how many times an event has occurred in regard
to instance i, such as accident counts at crossing i

i = The Poisson parameter, equal to the distribution mean and also the
variance (var (ki) =  )
The Poisson regression is fitted to the data by specifying the Poisson
parameter i to be a function of the explanatory variables as indicated in
Equation 4-2.
ln i   X i

(Eq. 4-2)

Where:

i = The Poisson parameter
X i = Independent variables

 = Model coefficient
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Using standard maximum likelihood methods, the Poisson regression can
then be estimated using the likelihood function

L    

L in Equation 4-3.

exp  exp X i exp Xi  i
ni !
n

i

(Eq. 4-3)

However, the Poisson model, as noted in Equation 4-2, is predicated on
the variance being equal to the mean, an equi-dispersion. Shankar, et al., (46)
suggests that, from a large body of literature, most accident data are likely to be
overdispersed. When the variance is not equal to the mean, the data is
considered overdispersed or underdispersed and can result in biased
coefficients, similar to heteroscedasticity in ordinary least-squares models. The
null hypothesis of equi-dispersion should then be tested to determine if the
Poisson model is appropriate.
In the event that the data is, in fact, overdispersed as Shankar, et al., (46)
suggests, the null hypothesis should be rejected and the Poisson model would
be inappropriate for this analysis. However, Shankar, et al., (46) go on to point
out that this limitation can be readily overcome by use of a variant of the Poisson
model, known as the negative-binomial model. The negative binomial introduces
an error term  i to Equation 4-2 to account for the bias cased by the
overdispersion as shown in Equation 4-4.
ln i   X i   i

(Eq. 4-4)
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Introducing this term allows the formulation of a new model, the negativebinomial model, which allows the variance to be different from the mean in such
a way as shown in Equation 4-5.
var (ki) = E k i 1  E k i 

(Eq. 4-5)

Where:
E(ki) = Expected value of accident counts at crossing i

 = Measure of the dispersion, equal to the variance of the error term
(gamma distributed rather than normally distributed in the case of the
Poisson model)
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